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This thesis analyzes the construction and early operational 
history of the USS Galena, a Civil War ironclad. It uses the Galena to 
examine the initial selection process for ironclads, to assess the ability of 
Northern industry to respond to the technical challenges of the war, to 
take a closer look at the often contentious process of ironclad 
construction, and to analyze the impact of this experimental design on 
the type of ironclads chosen to prosecute the war. 
The Galena was built as one of three experimental designs early 
in the war. The other two, the New Ironsides and the Monitor, were 
relatively successful, while the Galena had mixed results. She proved a 
tactical failure but a strategic success in the critical summer of 1862. 
Although unable to perform as well as expected, she had both a 
psychological and a physical impact during the Peninsula Campaign, 
playing a critical role in the salvation of General George Brinton 
McClellan's army after the Seven Days. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
America's Civil War, contrary to popular belief, did not create a 
revolution in naval design. At best, the sectional conflict provided "a 
rich testing ground for the technology of modern war. "u European 
navies, especially those of Great Britain and France, took the lead 
during the preceding decade in exploring experimental technologies. 
These wary rivals supplied the needed financial backing and industrial 
support for the pioneering work in armor, ordnance, and ship design 
that so dramatically altered the composition of the world's navies by 
1860. The 1850s witnessed the widespread introduction of the shell gun, 
rifled artillery, steam and screw propulsion, armored batteries, and 
iron hulled vessels. Great Britain and France each embarked on 
ambitious building programs designed to replace their obsolescent 
wooden ships with vessels incorporating the latest in naval technology. 
The pivotal vessel for each was the French Gloire, launched in 
November 1859, and the British Warrior, launched in December 1860. 2 
The ongoing revolution in naval design had not gone unnoticed or 
unheeded in the United States. Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur 
called for the construction of an iron hulled vessel as early as 1841. At 
least three were built but proved unsatisfactory and ships of this type 
soon fell into disfavor among American (and European) navalists. s 
Journal Model Followed: Civil War History 
The threat of war in 1841-1842 prompted the issuing of a contract for the 
first American armored vessel to Robert L. Stevens. This armored 
steamer, unfinished at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, underwent 
fits and starts of construction throughout the 1840s and 1850s and was 
the only serious American attempt to build an armored warship during 
that time. 4 
The United States Congress viewed the expanded British and 
French fleets with some trepidation in the latter half of the 1850s. The 
Committee on Naval Affairs, with the assistance of the Secretary of the 
Navy, produced a report in January 1859 assessing the needs of the 
United States Navy against the capabilities of the Royal Navy, considered 
the potential aggressor. This report, taking recent technological 
advances into consideration, came to a number of conclusions. It 
recognized that 
Within the last fifteen years the application of steam as a motive 
power to naval vessels; their improved armament of heavy guns, 
equally applicable to shot and shell; their increased size and 
improved models, have revolutionized the character of naval 
warfare, and diminished, in a remarkable manner, the inequality 
between frigates and forts. s 
Acknowledging the inability to compete with the British in terms of 
quantity, the report suggested that "in construction and equipment we 
must keep fully up with the times, " with each newly constructed vessel 
being an improvement on its predecessor, not only in the U. S. Navy but 
also in the Royal Navy. s Although the American naval establishment 
was aware of British experiments with armor and included information 
about several ironclad batteries in an appendix to the report, the report 
itself focused on the more pressing problem of applying adequate steam 
propulsion to the fleet. Accordingly, the committee recommended the 
construction of ten wooden steam ships of war, not realizing that 
technology, in the form of the Gloire and the Warrior, would make them 
second class vessels before they were ever built. ~ 
The crashing of Confederate shells into the masonry walls of Fort 
Sumter forced the Department of the Navy to rethink its strategic 
mission. The Confederate States, not Great Britain, would be the 
immediate foe. On April 15, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued a 
call for 75, 000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis, responding two days later, authorized the 
issuance of letters of marque by the Confederate States of America. s 
Lincoln countered with proclamations on the nineteenth and the twenty- 
seventh declaring a formal naval blockade of the Southern coast. The 
Union Navy, which boasted only forty-two commissioned vessels, thus 
became responsible for blockading 3, 549 statute miles of coastline and 
over 180 navigable harbors and inlets s 
Needless to say, ironclad construction was not a priority during 
the first months of the war. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles 
concerned himself with the basic problems at hand, First and foremost, 
he had to secure the defense of the nation's capitol. Steamers had to be 
leased or purchased to transport troops. Lincoln's proclamations meant 
that Welles had to oversee the improvisation of a blockading fleet. Any 
available vessel capable of mounting the necessary ordnance was 
quickly pressed into service and posted to Southern waters. Hundreds of 
new sailors had to be clothed, fed, and trained. Welles faced a logistical 
nightmare that defied simple solutions. Finally, as in most wars, both 
sides predicted a speedy victory that would not justify the time and 
expense needed to design and build these unproven ironclad 
behemoths. io John Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair, reflected this opinion to Welles when he suggested on May 11 
that "the necessarily large size, the cost and the time required for 
building an iron cased steam vessel is such that it is not recommended 
to adopt any plan at present. "ii It would take an extraordinary turn of 
events to modify the Navy's pragmatic decision. Such a turn was not 
long in coming. 
The Gosport Navy Yard, near Norfolk, became an important early 
casualty to Southern secession. Fearful of provoking secession in 
neutral Virginia, President Lincoln did not fill the patronage jobs in the 
navy yard with Unionists. In an effort to pacify the already precarious 
situation, he kept the current staff, primarily Southern Democrats, in 
their positions. The president and the Navy Department had two causes 
of concern. First and foremost, the Gosport Navy Yard was the most 
important facility of its kind in the United States. Its dry dock, ship 
houses, foundries, machine shops and boiler shops were among the 
most modern in the navy. The loss of this capacity would be detrimental 
to the Union war effort. is Second, the USS Merrimack awaited engine 
repairs in the yard. A first class screw frigate of 3200 tons, she carried 
two 10-inch pivot Dahlgren guns, fourteen 8-inch carriage guns and 
twenty-four 9-inch Dahlgren guns, making her one of the most 
formidable Union naval vessels afloat. is If she fell into Confederate 
hands, she would present an instant threat to the blockade. 
A Virginia convention passed an ordinance of secession on April 
17, 1861. Even though the ordinance would not be ratified by voters until 
April 23, the state militia immediately took steps to secure important 
Federal facilities, especially the Harper's Ferry armory and the Gosport 
Navy Yard. i4 On April 18, the Southern officers stationed at Norfolk 
resigned as a body. The Virginia state militia seized Fort Norfolk, the 
navy's powder magazine, the next day. Up to five thousand militia were 
rumored to be in the vicinity, waiting to seize valuable Federal assets. 
Commodore Charles S. McCauley, commandant of the navy yard, 
moved about in a befuddled state. Although the Merrimack's engines 
had been repaired since April 18, McCauley not only refused to permit 
the vessel to leave for a safer port but also prevented its broadside 
armament from being put on board ship. is 
Secretary Welles, kept informed of the situation in Norfolk, 
"became satisfied that the large amount of public property there was in a 
precarious condition. As a preventative, or matter of caution, it seemed 
to me advisable that a military force should be placed there to protect the 
yard, and to serve as a rallying point for Union men in case of 
emergency. "is Despite the initial objections of General Winfield Scott 
and members of the cabinet, Welles dispatched an expedition under the 
command of Commodore Hiram Paulding to relieve McCauley and 
prevent Federal supplies from falling into the hands of the 
insurrectionists. However, just a few hours before the expedition 
arrived in Norfolk McCauley panicked and ordered the yard's guns 
spiked and the Merri mack scuttled. By the time Paulding landed, the 
once proud vessel had taken on too much water to be salvaged quickly. 
Rumors of the rapidly concentrating militia continually filtered in, and 
on the evening of April 20 a nervous Commodore Paulding decided to 
destroy the yard's remaining facilities and evacuate its garrison to 
Washington. Powder trains were laid to many of the dockyard facilities 
and remaining ships, including the Merri mack. Amid some confusion 
the trains were lit and the remaining members of the relief expedition 
withdrew to their waiting vessels. The ensuing conflagration lit up the 
night sky as Paulding's force withdrew to Washington, satisfied they 
had achieved their objective of destroying any property that might be of 
use to the Confederates. ~7 
Unbeknownst to the retreating Yankees, their efforts failed to 
have the desired effect. Despite the spectacular blaze and resounding 
explosions, many valuable facilities remained untouched or only 
partially damaged. The Confederacy inherited vast quantities of naval 
stores, machinery, and tools. The yard's graving dock, required for the 
maintenance of ships' hulls, survived intact. Nore importantly, 
Norfolk's forges and foundries, which would play such a crucial role in 
the coming months, entered Confederate service fully functional. 
Somehow the Federals neglected to put them to the torch. However, the 
most impressive acquisition lay partially submerged on the bottom of the 
James River. McCauley's decision to scuttle the Merri mack 
inadvertently saved the most valuable part of the ship. Even though fire 
destroyed her upper works, her hull and machinery remained 
untouched and still usable. All she required was the application of 
ingenuity and vision. ~s 
Fortunately for the South, Confederate Secretary of the Navy 
Stephen R. Mallory recognized the importance of the emerging ironclad 
technology. He had kept abreast of European developments, especially 
after the success of French ironclad batteries at Kinburn during the 
Crimean War. While still quartered in Montgomery, Alabama, he sent 
a letter dated May 10, 1861, outlining his hopes for the new navy to 
Charles M. Conrad, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs. 
In it, Mallory noted, 
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the 
first necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire 
coast of the United States, prevent all blockades, and encounter, 
with a fair prospect of success, their entire Navy. 
If to cope with them upon the sea we follow their example 
and build wooden ships, we shall have to construct several at one 
time; for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to her 
comparatively numerous steam frigates. But inequality of 
numbers may be compensated by invulnerability; and thus not 
only does economy but naval success dictate the wisdom and 
expediency of fighting with iron against wood, without regard to 
first cost. rs 
Mallory knew the South did not currently possess the industrial capacity 
to build such a vessel. He closed his letter to Conrad by assuring the 
chairman that "an agent of the department will leave for England in a 
day or two, charged with the duty of purchasing vessels, and by him the 
first steps in the matter may be taken. " 
Not content to rely on efforts to obtain ironclads abroad, Mallory, 
having moved to Richmond with the rest of the government, broached 
the idea of a domestically built ironclad to Lieutenant John M. Brooke. 
Brooke, cognizant of the Confederacy's limited industrial capacity, came 
up with a simple design during the middle of June. This design, 
modified after consultations with John L. Porter, a constructor at the 
Gosport yard, became the basic plan for many of the Confederate 
ironclads built during the course of the war. Informed by the Tredegar 
Iron Works in Richmond that engines for such a craft were beyond its 
capabilities, the designers searched for alternatives. Confederate Chief 
Engineer William P. Williamson suggested they try to salvage what they 
could from the Merri mack, which had been freed from its resting place 
on May 30 by the Baker Wrecking Company. Porter and Brooke agreed 
that their design could be modified to fit the Merri mack's hull, and 
submitted a report to Mallory on June 25 recommending that course of 
action. Revised plans were presented to the Secretary on July 10, and on 
that same day he authorized the conversion of the hulk into an ironclad 
warship. zi 
Rumors of a Confederate ironclad made their way around 
Washington, especially after the loss of the Gosport Navy Yard. 
Whether or not these rumors were true, they prompted not only 
speculation, but also action. As early as June 24, Congress passed a 
joint resolution instructing Secretary Welles to investigate the possibility 
of completing the Stevens battery. Welles duly appointed a board whose 
report, issued at the end of the year, recommended against any further 
expenditures by the government towards what seemed a financial 
sinkhole. zz The battery returned to its intermittent retirement after 
briefly raising its head, not appearing again until after the war. 
President Lincoln called Congress together for a special session 
that began on July 4. At this time, Welles, drawing upon material 
gathered by Commander John A. Dahlgren, presented a report 
describing the current condition of the Union Navy and ofFering 
suggestions for its improvement. The Secretary noted that "other 
governments, and particularly France and England, have made [iron- 
clad steamers] a special object in connexion with naval improvements. " 
He conceded that "the period is, perhaps, not one best adapted to heavy 
expenditures by way of experiment, and the time and attention of some 
of those who are most competent to investigate and form correct 
conclusions on this subject are otherwise employed. " Nevertheless, he 
recommended "the appointment of a proper and competent board to 
inquire into and report in regard to a measure so important. "ss The 
Secretary's report closed by requesting permission to proceed with the 
construction of ironclad vessels if the board's investigation found them 
feasible. 24 
Senator John W. Grimes of the Naval Affairs Committee took up 
Welles' cause. Prompted by a Navy Department that not only heard 
rumors of Confederate ironclads with trepidation but also cast a wary 
eye towards European intervention, Grimes reminded his colleagues 
that "however valueless or valuable armored ships may be as cruisers, 
they certainly are destined to be valuable for the defense of harbors. " He 
introduced a bill on July 19 "to provide for the construction of one or 
more armored ships. " s The bill passed after a bitter two week struggle, 
10 
during which time the Stevens lobby was dealt its final blow. Congress 
approved the act on August 3, 1861, authorizing Welles "to appoint a 
board of three skilful naval officers to investigate the plans and 
specifications that may be submitted for the construction or completing 
of iron or steel-clad steamships or steam batteries. " The act also 
appropriated $1, 500, 000 for ironclad construction should the board's 
report be favorable, marking the entrance of the Union into the 
developing race for naval supremacy of the Eastern seaboard. 2s 
Secretary Welles, having received the necessary authorization 
from Congress, initiated a series of actions designed to achieve timely 
results. Deciding that the government navy yards would not be 
responsible for construction of the first ironclads, he turned to the 
private sector. On August 7 he published an advertisement soliciting 
offers from parties who are able to execute work of this kind, and 
who are engaged in it, of which they will furnish evidence with 
their offer, for the construction of one or more iron-clad steam 
vessels of war, either of iron or of wood and iron combined, for sea 
or river service, to be of not less than ten nor over sixteen feet 
draught of water; to carry an armament of from eighty to one 
hundred and twenty tons weight, with provisions and stores for 
from one hundred and sixty-five to three hundred persons, 
according to armament, for sixty days, with coal for eight days. 
The smaller draught of water, compatible with other requisites, 
will be preferred. The vessel to be rigged with two masts, with 
wire-rope standing rigging, to navigate at sea. 
A general description and drawings of the vessel, armor, 
and machinery, such as the work can be executed from, will be 
required. 
The offer must state the cost and the time for completing the 
whole, exclusive of armament and stores of all kinds, the rate of 
speed proposed, and must be accompanied by a guarantee for the 
proper execution of the contract, if awarded. 
Persons who intend to offer are requested to inform the 
department of their intention before the 15th August, instant, and 
to have their propositions presented within twenty-five days from 
this date. 27 
Having made his wishes known to Northern industry, Welles proceeded 
to the next item on his agenda. 
The day after publishing this announcement, Welles appointed 
three naval officers members of a board to assess proposals received. 
The Secretary originally approached John Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau 
of Construction and Repair, to oversee the selection and construction 
process. Despite the rumors of Confederate ironclad construction, 
Lenthall, like most of the other bureau chiefs, remained skeptical of 
these experimental vessels. He exempted himself from the board by 
claiming that his bureau was already taxed to its limits. 2s Welles then 
designated Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks and a close personal friend, as senior officer of the board. To aid 
Smith, the Secretary appointed two assistants: Commodore Hiram 
Paulding, the man who burned the Gosport Navy Yard, and 
Commander Charles H. Davis. The board was ordered to "convene at 
the Navy Department as early as practicable, and. . . make a written 
report of the result of its investigations of the subject. " 
The board met for the first time on September 5 and began to work 
its way through the incoming proposals. On September 16 the naval 
officers submitted their "Report on Iron Clad Vessels" to Secretary 
Welles. Admitting at the outset that they had "no experience and but 
scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture, " they considered 
it "very likely that some of our conclusions may prove erroneous. " The 
board had requested the services of a naval constructor to act as a 
technical advisor, but none were available, forcing them to draw upon 
their own experience and the reports of others. 
Before making its final recommendations, the board briefly 
examined the current debate over armored warships. Two schools of 
thought dominated the debate within naval circles. The first envisioned 
ironclads in a coastal and harbor defense role, usually in conjunction 
with shore-based fortifications. The board acknowledged the utility of 
such vessels, noting that "for river and harbor service we consider iron- 
clad vessels of light draught, or floating batteries thus shielded, as very 
important; and we feel at this moment the necessity of them on some of 
our rivers and inlets to enforce obedience to the laws. "si However, the 
board also recognized the limitations of these vessels, especially against 
masonry emplacements ashore. 
The second school, primarily composed of members of the British 
and French naval establishments, thought that ironclad steamers 
represented the future of ocean-going cruisers. The board was 
"skeptical as to their advantage and ultimate adoption. "sz They listed a 
number of disadvantages inherent to ironclad construction, including 
"the enormous load of iron, as so much additional weight to the vessel; 
the great breadth of beam necessary to give her stability; the short supply 
of coal she will be able to stow in bunkers; the great power required to 
propel her; and the largely increased cost of construction. " While 
acknowledging the primacy of ironclads in ship to ship combat, they 
pointed out that the greater speed of wooden cruisers allowed those 
vessels to pick and choose their fields of battle. Despite their 
disinclination towards ironclad cruisers, the board remained conscious 
of French and British efforts, noting "whilst other nations are 
endeavoring to perfect them, we must not remain idle. "s4 
Smith, Paulding and Davis grappled not only with what kinds of 
ironciads to build but also where to build them. Ordnance tests 
conducted in Europe and the United States indicated that these vessels 
1 
required at least 4 & inches of iron plate to resist standard naval 
armaments. Unfortunately, there were no mills in the United States 
1 
capable of rolling plates of that thickness. Plates of 4 2 inches could be 
hammered out, but rolled plates proved more resilient to shot and shell. 
English contractors possessed both the requisite rolling machinery and 
the shipbuilding expertise needed by the Union Navy. However, the 
board voiced two objections to signing contracts with the English. First, 
"a difflculty might arise with the British government in case we should 
undertake to construct ships-of-war in that country. " Second, and 
perhaps more important, "we are of opinion that every people or nation 
who can maintain a navy should be capable of constructing it 
themselves. "ss 
The naval board ultimately adopted a pragmatic construction 
strategy based on the requirements of the current conflict and the 
vessels of foreign navies. The board recognized that current demands 
required "vessels invulnerable to shot, of light draught of water, to 
penetrate our shoal harbors, rivers and bayous" and recommended "the 
construction of this class of vessels before going into a more perfect 
system of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war. " Although uncertain 
14 
of the ability of such vessels to bear the necessary armor, the board 
bowed to necessity and advised that they be built. Meanwhile, they 
suggested that the United States carefully observe the progress of the 
British and the French in ironclad construction so larger and more 
technologically advanced vessels could be built when circumstances 
permitted. s7 
Secretary Welles, reviewing the board's actions for Congress in 
December, 1861, acknowledged the obstacles faced during the selection 
process. He noted that "the difflculty of combining the two qualities of 
light draught and iron armor, both of which are wanted for service on 
our coast, could not be entirely overcome; but the board, in this new 
branch of naval architecture, has, I think, displayed great practical 
wisdom. . . " The vessels Enally chosen reflected different schools of 
naval thought, producing a true light draught ironclad, a prototype 
cruiser capable of dealing with the Gloire and the Warrior, and a hybrid 
gunboat that never quite found its own identity. 
In the eleven days between the board's Erst meeting and the 
issuing of the "Report on Iron Clad Vessels, " seventeen proposals 
underwent the scrutiny of these skeptical offlcers. Five emerged from 
the screening process with qualified recommendations. However, the 
board shelved two of these proposals because of their estimated cost. E. 
S. Renwick of New York afflxed a $1, 500, 000 price to his plan (equal to 
the entire amount allocated by Congress). Donald McKay of Boston, 
famous for designing clipper ships, stated that his ironclad could be 
built for $1, 000, 000. The board rejected both as too expensive and 
recommended that the remaining three proposals be issued contracts. ss 
The first recommended proposal, submitted by John Ericsson of 
New York, was for "a floating battery. . . based upon a plan which will 
render the battery shot and shell proof. " Although unconvinced of the 
vessel's seaworthiness, the design so intrigued two of the three board 
members that they authorized its construction. 4& The result was the 
USS Monitor, which gave her name to an entire class of ships. The 
second proposal, tendered by Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia, was 
considered "the most practical one for heavy armor" by the board. 4z 
This belt and battery vessel, similar in armor and displacement to the 
Gloire and the Warrior, had the highest price of the three accepted 
ships, $780, 000. 4s The traditional lines of the proposed vessel must have 
provided some comfort to the members of the board, on whose shoulders 
rested the fate of the Union Navy. Christened the USS New Ironsides, 
this ship participated in more engagements and fired more shots than 
any other Civil War ironclad. 
The final accepted proposal, proffered by C. S. Bushnell & 
Company of New Haven, Connecticut, called for an ironclad armored on 
the rail and plate principle. The board expressed caution over this 
design, fearing "that she will not float her armor and load sufficiently 
high, and have stability enough for a sea vesseL "44 Still, they 
recommended that she be built, as long as she overcame these 
objections. Accordingly, on September 27, 1862, the United States, 
represented by Gideon Welles, entered into a contract with Cornelius S. 
Bushnell and Henry L. Bushnell for "an Iron-Clad vessel upon the 
16 
principle of iron rails and iron plates. . . [to] be completed and delivered 
at the Navy Yard, New York in four months from the date of this 
contract ready for trial. "4s 
The contract called for a vessel one hundred and eighty feet in 
length, thirty six feet in breadth, and "depth of hold from inside of floor 
timber to underside of main deck plank twelve feet eight inches--with 
engines and machinery complete. " When completed, the vessel had to 
meet a number of stipulations. First, she must have the "capacity and 
stability to carry and work a battery not to exceed one hundred tons 
weight. " The battery itself would be provided by the government. 
Second, she must must "make a speed under steam of twelve knots, or 
sea miles, per hour, in smooth water, and carry coal in the bunker for 
ten days consumption at that speed. " Third, she would "have a 
schooner rig, with proper square sails. " Finally, she must "have 
stability to carry said armament, armor, boats, provisions, stores and 
outfits of all kinds with 2500 gallons of water in tanks, and a crew of 130 
persons, with all sails set, safely at sea as a cruising vessel. "4s 
The contract also contained safeguards designed to protect the 
government's interests. First and foremost, it allowed the Navy to 
assign a superintendent to the project who had "the right to reject any of 
the materials and work which shall not be of the best quality. "47 The 
terms of the contract called for the government to pay the Bushnells 
$235, 250 for the vessel. As the contractors submitted bills for at least 
$20, 000 approved by the superintendent, the Department of the Navy 
would reimburse them for three quarters of that sum. The remaining 
17 
twenty five percent was to be paid "after completion and delivery and 
satisfactory trial. " If the contractors violated the terms of the 
agreement during the course of construction, all sums paid out would be 
returned to the government, with "said vessel with all her 
appurtenances [being] held by the United States as collateral security 
until said liquidated damages - for money advanced, shall have been 
paid. " Finally, the contract prohibited any "member of Congress, officer 
of the Navy, or any person holding any office or appointment under the 
Navy Department" from holding shares in the vessel or gaining any 
personal benefit from its construction. If such improprieties occurred, 
the government could unilaterally declare the agreement null and 
void. 4s 
Despite the rigid time constraints and the exacting terms 
delineated in the agreement, the Department of the Navy closed the 
contract with a clause reflecting the uncertainties of ironclad 
shipbuilding. In an apparent effort to reconcile evolving technology with 
practical necessity, the final paragraph "stipulated that any immaterial 
improvements which the said parties may agree to, as the vessel 
progresses, may be made without prejudice to principal points in this 
contract. "4s Such flexibility both created and solved many problems 
during the course of construction. 
The construction and early career of this vessel, later designated 
the USS Galena, provides the focus of this study. Unlike the other two 
accepted proposals in the design competition, built as the USS Monitor 
and the USS Negro Ironsides, the Galena earned a reputation as a 
qualified failure. However, it is not enough to write her off in the brief 
paragraph or two she usually merits in most naval histories. The 
following pages explore not only the reasons for her failure as an 
experimental ironclad but also place her within the context of her times. 
The account of her construction history elucidates problems faced by the 
Navy Department as it rushed to harness the industrial might of the 
Northeast for the war effort. On a more personal level, the interaction 
between representatives of the Navy Department and the Galena's 
contractors demonstrates the tensions which developed between 
businessmen motivated by financial gain and naval officers who wanted 
to quickly and efficiently introduce ironclads to the fleet. The 
expectations of both parties were artificially high at the start of 
construction, which meant each had to compromise by the end. 
The early operational career of the Galena examines the process 
by which the Union determined the design of the ironclads used 
throughout the war from a slightly different perspective, emphasizing 
tactical failure and performance below expectations as a motivation for 
choice. However, it also demonstrates the strategic success of the 
Galena at a critical point during the war, when her psychological effect 
equalled or outweighed her actual physical effect. The resulting 
monograph should not only broaden the understanding of naval affairs 
in the East but also raise some interesting questions about how a nation 
gears up for war. 
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CHAPTER II 
''LIKE THE LARGER END OF AN EGG" 
Cornelius Bushnell held much more in his hands than a simple 
contract for wartime goods when he left the Navy Department. He and 
his brother, acting as the primary contractors, had been offered the 
opportunity to revolutionize the very essence of naval warfare. While the 
French and the British designed and built ships which might not face 
the test of battle for years, if ever, the Bushnells had just been given a 
license to create a vessel which was assured of seeing combat almost 
immediately after it entered service with the navy. A successful 
performance could mean more contracts for more ironclads, 
guaranteeing the brothers a comfortable future. All in all, it was an 
exciting proposition. Still, the government exercised a certain degree of 
control over the entire process, attaching several specifications to the 
contract. Although it was taking a risk on an untried design, the Navy 
Department made sure that basic requirements for a seaworthy vessel 
would be met. 
The design of the hull was markedly different than anything yet 
built in the United States or overseas, but closely followed traditional 
construction techniques. The materials and manner of construction, 
with the exception of the armor, could have been accomplished by any 
competent shipyard. The interior and exterior fittings would not differ 
in any degree from the pre-war steam screw frigates built for the navy. 
Likewise, the vessel's power plant followed a contemporary design 
already used widely in naval ships around the world. It was the 
Galena's shape, not her substance, that explored new aspects of naval 
design. 
The only other feature of the ship that hinted at innovative design 
was the armor plating. The armor scheme differed from that of other 
ironclads building in Europe and the United States for a number of 
reasons. One was, hopefully, to employ armor that would more 
effectively resist enemy fire, but the main reason was to accommodate 
limitations in the vessel's design and in capacities of the nation's 
industrial base. Designed as a gunboat, the Galena could not carry the 
armor load of the bigger ocean-going cruisers. Even if she could have 
carried that much armor, the North could not produce plates of the 
required thickness. Innovation guided the design, but necessity forced 
its adoption. 
Although the Bushnells provided financial backing, the actual 
design of the Galena sprang from the mind of Naval Constructor 
Samuel H. Pook. ~ The potential of armored warships had occupied 
Pook's mind since the outbreak of hostilities. He spent the summer of 
1861 in the West modifying the design of the first armored river 
gunboats, the "city class" vessels which played such a crucial role in 
campaigns in the Mississippi Valley. The exposed machinery and 
shallow draft of these river boats made the addition of armor plating a 
necessity, and Pook wrestled with the problems of weight, draft, and a 
means of securing armor to a vessel. Although unable to solve all of 
these problems before being recalled to Washington in July, the 
experience gave him a solid grounding in the mechanics of ironclad 
design and construction. 2 
Cornelius Bushnell spent at least the latter half of the summer of 
1861 in Washington, no doubt assessing his chances of landing a war- 
related contract. He was in close contact with Secretary Welles during 
the struggle to obtain funding for ironclads, and actively lobbied with a 
member of Congress from his home district to push for the bill' s 
passage. s At some point, perhaps during the congressional 
deliberations, Bushnell and Pook discussed ironclad design. Pook 
evidently convinced Bushnell of the soundness of his design. The 
Connecticut industrialist agreed to supply the necessary financial 
backing and submit Pook's plans to the naval board for consideration. 
Thus, as previously described, Bushnell 8z Company received one of the . 
coveted contracts. 
One of the most important stipulations of the contract allowed the 
navy to assign a superintendent to the project who had "the right to 
reject any of the materials and work which shall not be of the best 
quality. "4 Accordingly, Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks, informed the Bushnells on September 30 
that "Mr. S. H. Pook will be appointed superintendent of the vessel on the 
part of the United States, with instructions to see that all the conditions 
of the contract are fulfilled. "s Although Smith may have worried about 
the conflict of interest in assigning a designer to superintend his own 
vessel, he had little choice. Few men possessed Pook's experience in the 
construction of ironclad warships. 
The newly appointed superintendent evidently wasted little time 
getting to Mystic, Connecticut, where the Galena would be built. Five 
days later Smith addressed a letter to him there, enclosing "herewith a 
copy of the contract and specifications with C. S. and H. S. Bushnell for 
an ironclad vessel, to govern you in the superintendence of the 
construction of said vessel. "s The enclosed specifications, although 
excruciatingly detailed, were relatively straightforward. Divided into 
three sections, they itemized the structural requirements and 
construction techniques for the ship's hull, its engines, and its armor. 
Pook's instructions stipulated a vessel one hundred and eighty 
feet in length and thirty six feet in breadth, with a "depth of hold from 
inside of floor timber to underside of main deck plank, eleven feet eight 
inches. "7 The hull itself followed traditional construction techniques for 
wooden ships, with key components fabricated from white oak. The keel 
was to be of "White Oak of the best quality" made of no more than five 
pieces "scarphed horizontally, not edgewise. "s The bottom of the main 
keel was to be coppered before a two inch thick white oak shoe was put on 
and "fastened with 5 inch composition spikes. "s Cast iron shoes would 
be secured to the keelson to support the fore and main mast. io The stern 
and deadwood were also to be of white oak and coaked to the keel, with 
the deadwood "strapped with galvanized iron straps on the outside as 
may be required to make this part of the vessel perfectly secure. "ii The 
rudder was "to be secured to the keel and to the stern frame above in the 
best and most workmanlike manner [with] the rudder head to be 
completely fitted so as to keep out the water. "is 
The specifications called for a "frame of white oak & white 
chestnut" with "fillings of yellow pine or chestnut timber. " Each frame 
would be "bolted to the keel with one iron bolt. " The filling would "be 
bolted to the frame and raised with it, . . . and caulked solid above and 
below, before the plank[s] are put on. us Nautical parlance refers to 
each line of planking as a strake, and the Galena's specifications 
mandated distinct guidelines about the strakes on each part of the ship. 
The garboard strakes, among the most important, were "of white oak in 
thickness 6 inches fastened through the keel and each other where 
practicable. "&4 The specifications required four inches of white oak for 
the actual bottom planking. The bilge strakes could be either white oak 
or yellow pine but must be six inches thick. ~s In the case of both the 
garboard and bilge strakes, the thickness of the oak decreased as it came 
towards the bow and the stern. The remaining strakes to the 
1 planksheer would be 3 & inches thick. &s 
The planking in the hold could also be either white oak or yellow 
pine three inches thick. No planking was "required below the thick 
strakes forward and aft except at spaces where rooms are to be built. " 
There, "it will be boarded with 2 inch white pine. u7 The perimeter of 
the hold was designed for drainage. Constructed solely of yellow pine, it 
1 
was 5 & inches thick on the edge of the deck. However, the planking was 
1 
only 3 z inches thick between the edge of the deck and the actual deck 
surface, creating channels which facilitated the removal of water. The 
gun deck was constructed solely of yellow pine, this time 4 inches thick. 
This deck's "top timbers and connections [had] to be made strong 
31 
enough to resist the strain consequent upon the iron top" when the 
armor was affixed. A system of braces, beams, and stanchions 
supported both decks. &s 
FIGURE 1: HULL CROSS SECTION 
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While the construction techniques indicated a traditional wooden 
hull, the design called for something completely different. Instead of 
relatively vertical sides, the Galena's hull would have a pronounced 
curvature, prompting one observer to declare that the vessel looked "like 
the larger end of an egg. " (FIGURE 1l. He declared that "the 
advantages of this rounded form are apparent. A ball striking a flat 
surface at a right angle — that is, in a direct line — exerts its whole force, 
and either passes through, or is stopped, or rebounds. Now if it strikes 
at considerably less than a right angle, it glances off in another 
direction. "is Whether or not the concept would work remained to be 
seen, but the design represented a new approach to naval architecture. 
The Galena's hull specifications dealt with more than the hull 
itself. They also included the various accouterments which the 
contractors were expected to install. The contract price included a 
rudder, tiller, steering wheel, and capstan, all of iron, four brazed heavy 
copper pumps and a three hundred pound bell. The vessel was to be 
caulked with "oakum from new material" and all seams securely sealed 
with pitch. The bottom of the ship, following standard practice, was to 
be coppered with 24 ounce copper, "except in the vicinity of iron covering, 
where it will be covered with zinc" to prevent an adverse chemical 
1 
reaction. The gun deck was to be fitted with 11 z inch thick oak beds for 
two pivot guns and ring and eye bolts for the Galena's broadside 
armament. To service the ordnance, the contractors had to build 
"Magazine and Shell rooms as [the] Ordnance Bureau may direct, fitted 
with lamps, cocks for flooding, [and] shelves for powder" and "all the 
Store rooms, chain and shot lockers necessary. "zo 
Not all of the required equipment was so mechanical in nature. 
The creature comforts of the officers and crew also had to be attended to. 
First, for the captain, a cabin 
of seasoned white pine, to have state rooms, clothes lockers, berth, 
coat and hat hooks, pantry and water closet with fixtures 
complete, extension dining table of black walnut, chairs, camp 
stools, looking glass, wash stand, book shelves, one cot 5, cot 
hooks, hanging lamp, one table and cover, with 6 dish covers, 
shades for window, floor covered with Brussels carpet, cabin fitted 
with Venetian blinds and shades to the windows. zi 
The officers enjoyed similar accommodations. Their ward room floor 
was to be covered with oil cloth and supplied with an "extension dining 
table of black walnut" They had "rooms fitted with berths, lockers, coat 
% hat hooks, washstands and shelves, furnished with chair and camp 
stools [of] sufficient number, hanging lamp, one table cover, [and] six 
dish covers, " along with "hammock hooks for four persons. " The 
steerage was to be "fitted with berths, curtains, lockers, shelves, [an] 
extension table cherry, wash stand, two chairs and 8 camp stools. " 
Separate water closets were to be constructed for the ward room and the 
steerage. The forward berth deck, where the crew would be quartered, 
was to be "fitted with Sail room, store rooms, mess chests 6 in number, 
or more if required" and "hammock hooks for as many men as can be 
slung. " In addition to living quarters, Bushnell & Company was also to 
provide a dispensary closet, a general store room with an armory, arms 
chest and musket stands, and a galley capable of feeding 150 persons. 22 
When completed, the Galena was to have "3 good coats of paint 
complete. " She would have two white pine masts, spruce or hard pine 
yards and top masts, wire rope rigging, and sails of the best flax canvas 
available. Her forward mast would be rigged as a brig and her aft mast 
as a schooner. She would stow four wooden boats, "completely fitted 
with masts, sails, oars, boat hooks and gratings. . . and arranged as life 
boats. " These life boats could be mounted on "iron boat-davits two pair 
on each side [with] one set of davits at the stern. " The contractors also 
had to supply the ship's complement of anchors, grapnels, cables, 
hawsers, and "all necessary fittings for promptly working anchor and 
cable. " As far as the rest of the hull went, "stores, ordnance and 
ordnance stores and equipments extra are to be furnished by the Navy 
Department. " 
The specifications for the Galena's engine were less exacting than 
those for the hull, leaving room for experimentation on the part of the 
builder. The contract called for "a pair of condensing steam propeller 
engines. . . with two horizontal cylinders — each 48 inches diameter of 
bore, and 36 inches stroke of piston. "&4 Although an engine based on 
vertical cylinders would have been easier to maintain and easier to build 
because of the widespread use of similar designs on commercial 
steamers, "its height [would be] so great that it would be exposed to 
injury by shot. "2s The engines were to be positioned so "that when one 
engine is on the centre the other shall be on the half centre, or nearly 
so. " In an apparent effort to provide a backup mechanism, "each engine 
[was] to be so arranged by its pumps, pipes and connections that it may 
be worked independently, or be used in connection with the other as a 
double engine. "2s 
The engine was to be built of wrought iron, especially the "shafts, 
levers, cranks and all moving gears and connections. . . The steam 
opening and valves of the cylinders [were] to be of the largest proportions 
used for quick working engines, " relying on "simple and effective valve 
gear" for ease of operation. Likewise, the "condensing arrangement 
[was] to consist of effective and perfect air pumps" with an "efficient and 
satisfactory apparatus for producing" surface condensation. The engine 
was to have two tubular boilers with "a fire surface of at least four 
1 thousand square feet. " The Galena's design called for "tanks of 4 inch 
iron to contain 2000 gallons of water with distillery apparatus and tank 
complete" to operate the steam machinery. In a manner reminiscent of 
the hull specifications, "the engines and boilers [were] to be provided 
with all the necessary iron, floorings, ladders, gratings, tools, 
instruments, valves & cocks, and to be completed and in perfect order for 
service. . . and to be provided with all the appliances for durable, safe, 
and economical working. " The object of the engine, the propeller, was to 
be fashioned from brass. s~ 
The final set of specifications dealt with the Galena's armor 
plating. The contractors had the option of using either steel or high 
quality iron plates. The proposed armor consisted 
1 5 
of a girder chair or rail. . . 5 & inches broad by s inch thick rolled 
. . . in suitable lengths. These chairs are placed eight inches 
apart from centre to centre, bent to the form and placed 
lengthwise with the vessel, from a point four feet below the water 
line at midships and terminating at the water line at stem and 
stern and fastened to the sides of the vessel by one inch hook- 
headed bolts about 12 inches apart, passing to the inside of the 
vessel, and there secured by nut, screw and washer. The steel or 
3 iron plates also rolled for this purpose, . . . [are] 7 s inches broad, 
1 
14 inches thick and armed with flanches which interlock with 
corresponding projections on the girder chair. The intermediate 
and continuous tongue, also a rolled part of the chair or rail, is 
rivetted over contiguous plates, thus firmly securing the plates to 
the chair or rail. ss 
In order to ensure the secure attachment of the outside plates to the 
rails, not more than five 1 inch bolts would be countersunk to the surface 
of each plate and secured on the interior of the vessel by nut and screw, 
presenting an even surface and maintaining the integrity of the armor. 
The point of juncture between plates would be cemented and caulked. 
(FIGURE 2l. 2s 
FIGURE 2: ARMOR CROSS SECTION 
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The armor would extend up to the edge of the woodwork above the 
main deck. An arched iron roof would then be built over the gun deck on 
the same rail and plate principle as the sides of the ship. However, the 
1 3 thickness of the plates was reduced from 1 4 to 4 inches. The design 
included a row of stanchions running the length of the vessel to support 
the roof and check any vibrations. Finally, "for the purpose of 
increasing the resisting power of the armor, " the specifications 
suggested a layer of vulcanized india rubber between the hull and the 
1 1 iron rail 1 & inches thick, adding 16 & tons to the weight of the vessel. so 
Unknown to the Bushnells, a series of experiments carried out by 
the French and British questioned the utility of this type of armor 
scheme. The French conducted a number of tests in 1856 on targets 
representing several different armoring techniques. These tests, which 
ultimately determined the type of armor used on the Gloire, yielded an 
unexpected result which was promptly incorporated into all French 
ironclads. The armor had been attached to its wooden backing with bolts 
secured with nuts. However, this "had the serious defect that frequently 
the bolts broke and the nuts flew off when the plate was struck by a 
projectile, " creating potentially harmful missiles within the confines of 
a warship. The French solved the problem by securing their armor to its 
wooden backing with screws. The Bushnell proposal relied on bolts, to 
the detriment of the design when taken into combat. sr 
French and British ironclads, either proposed or constructed, 
were designed on the "belt and battery" principle, as was the New 
Ironsides, then building in Philadelphia. The armor for these ships 
consisted of a series of iron plates, which, on the New Ironsi des, were 
I fifteen feet long, twenty-eight inches wide, and 4 & inches thick. Each 
plate had a groove around the perimeter, on which tongue pieces of iron 
would be fastened to link the plates together. s2 The British Admiralty, 
contemplating the continued use of this design for vessels then building, 
tested targets during the spring of 1861. Its Special Committee on Iron 
issued a preliminary report in August, 1861 and a final report in March, 
1862. The final report declared: 
All tonguing and grooving, or any departure from plane-edges, is 
a source of weakness to each particular plate; is liable to assist in 
destroying neighbouring plates which would not otherwise be 
affected by a blow, and has structural disadvantages, in 
preventing facility in repairing a damaged ship, or changing a 
damaged plate. ss 
The report and test results impressed the Admiralty enough for it to 
change the armor design on vessels which had not yet received their 
iron plating. 
Even if the Bushnells and Samuel Pook had been aware of the 
British and French experiments, and chances are that they were not, 
the Galena's proposed plating probably would not have been changed for 
three important reasons. First, the ship was much smaller than any 
contemporary ironclads, with the exception of John Ericsson's Monitor, 
and could not carry as much armor as her bigger counterparts. The 
British Warrior displaced almost 9000 tons, the French Gloire over 5600 
tons, and the New Ironsides over 4200 tons. In contrast, the Galena 
would displace about 950 tons when built. She was designed to serve as a 
coastal gunboat capable of steaming up the myriad rivers of the eastern 
seaboard of the United States. This mission demanded a shallow draft, 
which meant she would have to carry a reduced armor load. The 
Monitor, although it too would displace less than 1000 tons, looked like 
nothing else built for contemporary naval warfare and did not serve as a 
point of comparison. Indeed, its popular moniker, "Ericsson's Folly, " 
indicated the level of confidence placed in the vessel by an incredulous 
public. s4 
The second reason for continued faith in the Galena's armor was 
the support given to the design in scientific circles. Details of the ship' s 
construction were openly discussed and debated by the press. This was 
not an unusual phenomena; throughout the Civil War the technical 
merits and defects of weapons used by both sides were bandied about in 
popular publications of the day. The Scientific American pondered the 
qualities of the Galena's armor in its November 2, 1861 issue. The first 
half of its article gave a detailed description of the armor, discussing in 
turn the rails, the plates, and the proposed method of fastening the 
armor to the hull of the vessel. The second half offered editorial opinion 
of the success of the design. According to the article, surface mounted 
bolts "have proved the weak places in the armor of the iron-clad ships in 
the English and French navies. " The Galena's design avoided this 
problem because the bolts holding the armor to the hull were affixed to 
the rails, not the plates, and therefore were not exposed. With this 
hindrance removed, the problem became one of thickness and not 
stability of armor. Then, the author asked rhetorically, "if the plates are 
as thick as those upon the English and French war ships, and securely 
fastened, why should they not be as impregnable?" 
Having answered its own question in the course of the article, The 
Scientific American pointed out the economic advantages of this system 
of armor. It noted that "twelve to fifteen cents per pound is as low as the 
Warrior style of plates can be forged in this country. " After forging, 
"four or five cents per pound for planing, [and] tonguing and grooving" 
had to be added to the cost. However, the Galena's armor, because it 
could "all be rolled and so far finished in the rolling mill that nothing is 
left to be done but to fit them to the sides of the ship" could be 
manufactured for about half the cost. Yankee ingenuity would 
apparently match the best Europe could offer and do it for a much 
cheaper price, which no doubt made Northern industry feel good about 
itself. ss 
Despite The Scientific American's optimism, the third reason for 
this innovative armor design was based squarely on the inability of 
Northern industry to produce iron plates at the beginning of the war as 
thick as those manufactured in Europe. British and French tests 
during the latter half of the 1850s came to the conclusion that only plates 
1 
at least 4 z inches thick could resist the naval ordnance of the day. 
However, the manufacture of plates this thick was still a relatively 
complicated process successfully achieved to this date only in Europe. 
The Scientific American explained the process, "a matter of greater 
difficulty than those unacquainted with the work would imagine, " to its 
1 
readers in the spring of 1862. "A pile of four plates, " each 2 z inches 
thick, "is heated in a special furnace. . . and is drawn out by a liberating 
chain. . . on to an iron carriage, which conveys the pile to the rolls. . . 
41 
As the plate passes through the rolls it is received on the other side upon 
a roller frame. " This receiving frame was inclined, so that when the 
iron had gone through the rolls, the rolls could be reversed and the iron 
would go back through to the carriage. The carriage took the iron back 
to the furnace where the entire process was repeated "until the 10 inches 
1 thickness is reduced to 4 2 inches. 
" The rolled plate was lifted off the 
carriage by a crane onto a slab of cast iron, where an iron cylinder 
weighing nine tons was rolled over it "until the curvature which the 
plate has acquired in the rolling is entirely removed. " Finally, the crane 
removed the plate and put it onto a planing machine "where the final 
operation of planing its sides and ends is completed. "s 
The North, or the South, for that matter, did not possess a rolling 
1 
mill capable of producing 4 2 inch plate. The Galena's armor scheme 
was designed to circumvent this technical problem while providing an 
equivalent amount of protection. Although the New Ironsides would be 
1 
armored with 4 z inch plates, she would not be delivered to the Navy 
until September, 1862, several months after both the Monitor and the 
Galena joined the fleet. The resulting interval gave industry time to 
convert its machinery to produce plates of the required thickness. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the construction 
history of the Galena without placing it within the context of the 
industrial development of the United States. The dawn of the nineteenth 
century found the American iron industry in a crude state. The 
majority of iron was manufactured using a two-step smelting and 
refining process that depended on local supplies of ore and charcoal. 
The predominantly agricultural economy of the time dictated the type of 
items produced. Most iron works catered to local needs, fabricating cast 
iron utensils and their principle product, the bar iron used by 
blacksmiths. Because of the high start up cost associated with such an 
enterprise, they were often owned by partnerships. Still, by 1860 
ironworks "were in production for a time at least in every state east of 
the Mississippi, except for three in the Deep South, as well as in several 
states of the trans-Mississippi West. "s 
The introduction of rolling and puddling technology changed the 
character of the industry. While traditional ironworks continued to 
manufacture their wares, the cutting edge of the industry moved to 
more urban facilities that utilized anthracite coal for production and the 
developing transportation infrastructure to distribute goods. First the 
rolling mills and then the blast furnaces gravitated towards the cities as 
the scale of many operations jumped dramatically. The expense of the 
new technology also facilitated this shift; more investors could be found 
in urban areas. The addition of these investors, many of them shrewd 
businessmen interested in securing sources of supply for their own 
ventures, helped foster modernization. 4 Production figures reflected 
increasing technical sophistication. The scattered ironworks around 
the United States manufactured 113, 000 tons of hammered and rolled 
iron goods in 1830. That figure increased to over 500, 000 tons just before 
the outbreak of hostilities in 1861. 4i 
Although eastern Pennsylvania produced significant quantities of 
iron, the emerging iron industry concentrated itself around the western 
part of the state, which had plentiful supplies of anthracite coal and 
access to the network of ore-carrying steamships and railroads that 
linked the recently developed Lake Superior ores to the hungry mills. 
Between 1830 and 1840, production in Pennsylvania quintupled. By 1847, 
it had more than doubled again. 4z By 1860, Pennsylvania manufacture 
almost 60 percent of the iron ore produced in the United States, with 
Ohio and New York also adding sizable quantities. Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, which made more iron than any other county in the 
United States in 1858, produced about 90, 000 tons. New York churned 
out 74, 645 tons from fifteen furnaces in 1860, mostly located in the 
southern highlands and the Lake Champlain region. Significantly, 
Rennselaer County, New York, where the Galena's iron was processed 
and refined, produced about 30, 000 tons of iron in 1858, the second 
highest total in the country. 4s 
The iron industry did not develop and mature in isolation. The 
ready availability of large quantities of iron meant that a number of 
related industries rose into prominence during this period. Like the 
iron industry, they tended to concentrate in the Middle States around 
Pennsylvania. The key offshoot industry related to the construction of 
the Galena was steam technology. American industry expanded too fast 
to continue to rely on traditional sources of power, especially water. The 
introduction of efficient cost-effective steam engines released 
manufacturers from dependence on running water to power their 
enterprises and allowed them to expand to potentially lucrative areas 
which had been closed to them for logistical reasons. 44 
The original steam engine developed in England by James Watt at 
the close of the eighteenth century worked on the basis of low pressure, 
which limited the amount of work it could perform. The Watt engine 
"was a heavy and complicated mechanism, costly to build and difficult to 
maintain and keep in repair. " An American engineer named Oliver 
Evans, who operated two production facilities in Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh, tackled the problem after the turn of the century and created 
an engine capable of operation at much higher pressures, thereby 
increasing the amount of work an engine of a given size could perform. 
It was simpler to build than the Watt engine, easier to maintain, lighter, 
and cost less. As a result, it revolutionized American industry and 
transportation. The most powerful engines were placed on the 
steamboats which plied the Atlantic coast and the inland river system. 
By the time of the Civil War, over 3500 steamboats had been built. 
Although their safety record was dubious at times, the sheer number of 
engines produced ensured a vibrant industry open to experimentation 
and continued improvement of design. The only other industry 
employing equally powerful engines was iron rolling. 4s 
By the beginning of the Civil War, American industry had taken 
several important steps that foreshadowed the industrial might of the 
Gilded Age. A recognizable industrial base was taking shape in the 
Northeast in the form of iron mills, machine shops and other business 
endeavors. Although some aspects may not have been as refined as in 
Europe, especially with regard to specific products, the United States 
possessed a fluid and dynamic industrial base eager to accept the 
challenges of innovation required by the impending conflict. As Samuel 
Pock pondered the rigid specifications and stipulations for the yet- 
unbuilt Galena, he could take some measure of comfort knowing the 
extent of the technology and vibrant imagination available to his 
subcontractors. 
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CHAPTER III 
"I SHALL DEMAND HEAVY FORFEITURES FOR DELAY' 
Building the Galena provided valuable experience that would be 
applied to future naval contracts as the government groped its way 
through the hitherto unexplored waters of large scale procurement. 
Transforming the specifications of the Bushnell brothers' contract with 
the United States government into reality presented Northern industry 
with a tremendous challenge. Despite the occasional work on the 
Stevens Battery and the few iron hulled vessels built during the previous 
twenty years, no discernable pool of shipwrights and contractors skilled 
in the art of ironclad construction existed in the Union. Fortunately for 
the North, its industrial base proved dynamic and responsive to wartime 
exigencies, adapting to the task at hand and ultimately fabricating a 
product which met the intent of the contract, if not most of the terms. 
The construction process would not be without its pitfalls. The 
Galena would undergo design modifications, some of which met 
considerable resistance from the Navy Department. Not surprisingly, 
construction of the inner hull proceeded almost without incident 
because this part of the ship used traditional construction techniques. 
The experimental nature of the vessel allowed certain shortcuts to be 
taken, although not without some disagreement between the contracting 
parties. The primary points of contention which developed in the 
coming months focussed around the implementation of the new 
ironclad technology; the contractor and the government's 
representatives debated how the ship was to be built. By the time of the 
ship's launching, it was still unfinished and its capabilities were still in 
question. Throughout the entire process, the superintending naval 
officer took great pains to ensure that the government received exactly 
what it was paying for. 
Commodore Joseph Smith, chairman of the original ironclad 
board that recommended construction of the Galena, was given the 
responsibility of overseeing the building of each of the three ironclads. 
Several years after the war, Gideon Welles reminisced that Smith, "in 
addition to great nautical and civil experience, possessed a singularly 
mechanical and practical mind. "i The efforts of the following months 
severely tested both the patience and limits of Smith's "practical mind. " 
He fought to protect the interests of the government from contractors 
whose devotion to the cause he must have doubted at times. Despite the 
seemingly rigid requirements appended to the contract, specific details 
remained open to negotiation during the construction process as either 
the government or the contractors changed their minds about how the 
vessel should be built. Some of those changes were motivated by efforts 
to cut costs or ease construction while others were modifications 
unforeseen at the time of the contract brought about by necessity during 
the construction process. 
Smith's first letter to the Bushnells already expressed some 
misgivings about the vessel's design. While informing the brothers of 
the appointment of Samuel Pook as the government's superintendent, 
he expressed the opinion that "the deck plank of your vessel [is] too thin 
by an inch, but it has not been changed — the specifications are as you 
made them. " At the same time, he asked for a deck plan, not included 
in the original proposal, so "that arrangements may be made for the 
ports so soon as the battery shall be decided on" and notified the brothers 
that "it will require three months to test satisfactorily the qualities 
specified and warranted. " The commodore's letter served notice that he 
would not wield a rubber stamp during the construction phase. z 
Still, Smith remained open to suggestion. In a letter to Pook five 
days later, he noted that "the vessel is to be wider than stated in these 
specifications, a modification which Mr. Bushnell thought proper to 
make, and one which will be very acceptable to the Department. " Pook 
was in Mystic, Connecticut, where the ship's hull was to be crafted. 
Mystic had a long tradition of ship building, extending back to its first 
English settlement in 1650. Besides being suitably located for fishing 
and trading along the Atlantic coast, the Mystic River valley possessed 
ample timber, a number of protected anchorages, and shelving river 
banks ideal for building ships of all sizes. Insatiable demand for bigger 
vessels during the nineteenth century, especially after the discovery of 
gold in California, spurred expansion in Mystic. Traditional builders of 
small boats continued to supply local markets, while larger yards 
increased the size of their operations to handle the burgeoning market. 
A number of new yards specializing in larger vessels came into the area 
just before the Civil War, including Maxon, Fish and Company in 1852. 
The ready supply of raw materials, skilled labor, and available 
technology made starting such a business relatively easy if infused with 
ample capital. 
Cornelius Bushnell approached Charles Mallory in June, 1861 
about the possibility of building an ironclad gunboat in his yards, among 
the largest and most prosperous in Mystic. Dun & Bradstreet listed 
Mallory as "the wealthiest man in Mystic — the richest man in the 
vicinity. " Mallory, thinking that Bushnell wanted to build the type of 
traditional gunboat for which the navy had advertised in April, offered to 
build it for $80, 000, not realizing that Bushnell had a unique new design 
in mind. Bushnell turned to Mallory's Mystic competitor, Maxon, Fish 
and Company, who offered a better price and seemed to understand the 
complexities of the design. 4 
Although the hull would be built at Mystic, the vessel would be 
finished elsewhere. The Navy Department's four month completion 
deadline forced Bushnell to distribute the work among various 
subcontractors in the region. An acquaintance of his, John Ericsson, 
faced similar difficulties with his own vessel, the Monitor, Curiously, 
Bushnell had been instrumental in prodding Ericcson into submitting 
plans for the Monitor to the naval board. Concerned by predictions that 
the Galena would not be stable, he went to Ericsson at the suggestion of 
Cornelius Delamater so the Swedish engineer could double check Pook's 
calculations. Having pronounced the vessel satisfactory, Ericsson 
hauled out a musty box from which he pulled a scale model of a Monitor- 
style battery. Sensing a lucrative financial opportunity, Bushnell 
convinced him to submit the design to the naval board and interceded on 
Ericsson's behalf with Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. The design 
was accepted after some wrangling and Bushnell put up part of the 
money for the initial investment. s 
Bushnell and Ericcson shared a similar circle of friends and 
associates, many of whom became involved in the construction of both 
vessels, either as investors, contractors, or both. Two of the men who 
joined Bushnell in backing Ericsson, John A. Griswold and John F. 
Winslow, designed and supplied the armor for the Galena. Griswold 
worked at a number of ventures in his youth in Troy, New York, 
including the hardware business, bookkeeping, and a wholesale and 
retail drug business. He became an agent for the Rensselaer Iron 
Works, which he bought out a few years before the Civil War. However, 
Griswold's real love was politics; he served as mayor of Troy before the 
war and was elected to Congress in 1862, becoming an ardent champion 
of the Navy. Griswold left the management of the company to his friend 
John Winslow. s 
Originally from Vermont, John Winslow came from a 
background rooted in iron manufacturing. His father was an 
ironmaster and, after a short stint as a clerk in a mercantile house, 
Winslow also entered the iron business. He spent eight years in New 
Jersey, the last six as the owner of a small foundry, before agreeing to 
become the managing partner of the Albany Iron Works. Winslow, 
"whose experience in the working of metals is not excelled by any one 
engaged in the trade, " was actively involved in the technical end of 
things. 7 
The Rensselaer Iron Works was the parent company of the 
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Rensselaer Rolling Mill, where the actual metallurgy took place. 
Located on the south end of Troy, it devoted itself for the most part to rail 
production before the war. In 1856, this mill produced 12, 650 tons of 
rails and 862 tons of merchant bar. By 1859 the mill had eighteen 
furnaces and four trains of steam-driven rolls. The Albany Iron Works, 
a more substantive establishment perched on the Hudson River, had "40 
furnaces, 8 trains of rolls, 60 nail, 11 spike, 2 rivet machines, and 2 
hammers for railroad axles, and a machine for wrought iron chairs" in 
1859. It employed about 600 men. Together, these two companies, 
operating in tandem on many projects, were the largest producers of 
iron in the country. Their production capacity, when linked to 
Griswold's extensive political connections, brought in more than its fair 
share of government contracts during the war. 
Despite the array of technical expertise employed by Bushnell, 
Commodore Smith remained skeptical of the vessel's armor scheme. 
He advised Pook that "if you are to superintend the armor of the vessel, it 
may be necessary for you to go to Troy before the vessel goes there or the 
armor is put on. " Articulating the fears of the other members of the 
ironclad selection board, Smith acknowledged that he was "very anxious 
about the stability of the vessel, and have doubts whether she will be able 
to carry her armor effectually. " One week later, Smith succumbed to 
pessimism and notified Pook that "as it is important to have some one to 
superintend the iron work of the vessel, I have appointed Engineer 
D[aniel] P. Martin for that duty, and ordered him to Troy, N. Y. " The 
same day, Smith wrote a letter to Martin asking him to accept an 
appointment superintending the ship's armor and power plant. He 
offered to pay "$5 per day for your services, and your actual traveling 
expenses. " Confident of a positive reply, which he would get, Smith 
enclosed the vessel's armor and engine specifications. 
Meanwhile, construction on the Galena progressed. On October 
12, Smith received certificates from Pook through Bushnell verifying 
"that work and materials to the amount of $40, 000 has been put upon the 
hull and machinery of your vessel. " Accordingly, Smith sent bills in 
triplicate back to Mystic for Pook's signature. Bushnell kept one copy 
and the two remaining copies were then returned to the Bureau of 
Yards and Docks for filing. Actual payment would be made through a 
navy agent in New York. io 
Ongoing construction meant reevaluating and modifying the 
ship's design. Pook sent Smith the requested deck plan, which so 
thoroughly confused the commodore that he prepared his own and sent 
it back to Mystic, along with the first inklings of the type of ordnance the 
Galena would carry. The Navy's ordnance experts "proposed to put on 
the vessel four broadside IX inch Dahlgren guns, and two rifle guns, 
eighty-pounders, one forward and one aft. " Still, they would not make a 
decision until an officer had been to Mystic to "confer about her 
armament and its fitment. "ii The original hull plans did not include 
specifications for the gun ports because Pook did not know during the 
planning stage what the ship's armament would be. Consequently, 
their size and design had to be negotiated during the construction phase. 
A series of drawings passed between Mystic and the Navy 
Department during the first days of November. Pook's initial design 
dismayed Commodore Smith. He reported to Bushnell that "Mr. Pock 
has sent a plan with eight ports aside, over four feet in width. How he 
could imagine that such openings were to be left for an enemy's shot, 
when only four or six broadside guns were intended, I am at a loss to 
divine. " Smith mulled over the problem and dispatched his solution 
back to the shipyard. He suggested six ports on a side, with each port 
"about two or three inches narrower outside, and three inches wider 
inside" so the cannon could still be aimed with a smaller opening visible 
to the enemy. After musing over the problem a few more days, he 
informed Pook that "the ports must be plated with iron, and made to 
shut on the inside, " presenting a hull fully armored on its exposed 
surfaces. By November 7, Smith had changed his mind again, sending 
a plan with seven ports on each side for Pook's consideration. The guns 
would be mounted on carriages, three to each broadside, so that they 
could theoretically be shifted among the ports depending on the 
situation. In a letter to Pook written the next day, Smith commented 
that "as Commodore Gregory has fixed the ports, &c. , under the Bureau 
of Ordnance, I have nothing more to say on that subject. "u2 Pook must 
have been relieved, for now he could continue with the ship' s 
construction. 
At about the same time, Pook requested permission from Smith to 
dispense with the India rubber underlay and replace it with a layer of 
thin iron, but the commodore did not approve "as one of the strongest 
arguments used by the contractor for the iron of your vessel was that 
vulcanized rubber would be most effective in resisting shot. " Still, Smith 
exercised some discretion, opting to wait for the results of experiments 
conducted by the contractor on the armor scheme before making up his 
mind. However, Smith cautioned the superintendent about plating the 
vessel before launching it, an idea broached by Bushnell possibly in an 
effort to save time and meet the terms of the contract. In his opinion not 
only would its sides settle two inches, but "she will probably roll over 
without anything inside as ballast" once she was launched. 
A more serious disagreement between Pook, Bushnell, and Smith 
developed over the vessel's rudder. Apparently, Pook "very improperly 
authorized the substitution of iron for brass in the propeller. . . the 
rudder and after stern post" without consulting Smith. Smith wrote a 
polite letter to Cornelius Bushnell pointing out the contract's explicit 
reference to a brass propeller "and the rudder and outer stern post, of 
metal, of course meaning brass as well as brass bearings. " In separate 
letters to Bushnell, Pook, and Daniel Martin, Smith voiced several 
concerns about this apparently minor turn of events. First, the use of 
iron implements on the outer hull posed a mechanical problem. Like 
any other ship of the day, the "bottom of the vessel must be coppered to 
prevent destruction by worms. " Because of the adverse chemical 
reaction and resulting corrosion between copper and iron, "there must 
be a strip of zinc to prevent contact" wherever the coppered hull 
approached iron accoutrements. For example, such a strip was 
intended for placement below the iron armor, which descended beneath 
the waterline. 
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Smith also kept the financial interests of the United States in 
mind, a recurring theme throughout the Galena's construction, Iron 
parts could be procured or fabricated much cheaper than comparable 
brass items. By substituting iron for brass, Bushnell increased his 
profits on the vessel. The commodore promptly warned him that "in 
case an iron propeller, rudder &c. , is substituted for brass, the 
difference in cost will be deducted from the price of the vessel. He 
reiterated the point to Martin, under whose responsibility fell the 
engines and fittings, noting "the contractor will deduct the difference in 
cost from the price of the vessel, which is $235, 250, complete and ready 
for sea. "us Try as he might, Bushnell would not easily make more than 
his predetermined profit on the Galena. 
Brass enjoyed widespread use in the navy because of its durability 
and had become standard in a service that emphasized durability in its 
vessels. However, Smith realized that construction of the Galena and 
the other ironclads differed markedly from his previous experiences in 
the Bureau of Yards and Docks. These ships were built as wartime 
emergency measures, much like the ninety-day gunboats building on 
the Mississippi River at the same time. The Union needed two things: 
serviceable craft capable of carrying out the inunediate needs of the war 
and experience in building armored vessels that could be applied to the 
ships that must surely follow. After "scanning the specifications. . . 
more closely, " Smith wrote "the vessel will not be very strong, or one to 
wear long. " Still, he entreated Pook to "make her as strong as possible 
under the contract. " In light of the realization that the Galena would 
probably not serve the navy for an extended period, he conceded privately 
to Martin that "as I do not calculate this vessel will last long, and as she 
is an experiment, it may be perhaps as well to let the propeller, rudder, 
8zc. , be of iron. "i 
At a more fundamental level, Pook's authorization to use iron 
instead of brass challenged Smith's authority over the project, and 
Smith acted decisively to let the constructor know who ran the show. He 
informed Pook that he was "surprised that you should have suggested 
the substitution of iron for brass in the propeller, rudder, Rc. , before 
reporting to me your views. " Smith proceeded to recapitulate the terms 
of the contract to Pook, who doubtless was all too familiar with them 
because he had designed the original specifications. Having put Pook in 
his place, the commodore informed him that "I cannot consent to the 
substitution of iron before I take advice on the subject. " i7 As the letter to 
Martin shows, Smith was already disposed toward the substitution, 
although he would not let Bushnell or Pook know it. However, by 
making Pook wait for confirmation from Washington, Smith asserted 
his control over the project. 
Smith seemingly put his foot down on the controversy a few days 
later. He notified Bushnell & Co. by telegraph on November 14 that "I 
insist on a composition rudder and stern post as specified, 
notwithstanding delay. " He followed the telegram up with a letter 
written the same day, reminding Bushnell that "the contract provides 
for no modifications without the consent of the contracting parties. 
Now, I must insist on the adherence to the contract and specifications as 
regards the metal or composition propeller, rudder and stern post, as 
well as the copper sheathing. " Despite the tough talk, Smith "still [held] 
in abeyance the question of composition rudder, &c. , " pending Martin' s 
opinion. Martin, probably bearing in mind that this vessel would have a 
short life in the navy, agreed that it could get by with an iron rudder, 
propeller, and stern post. Smith, having received the expert opinion he 
desired, notified Bushnell that "I have come to the conclusion to accept 
your proposition to substitute iron for brass in the propeller, after stern 
posts, rudder, Rc. , for the vessel under your contract, dated September 
27, 1861, you deducting, according to your proposition, the difference of 
cost between brass and iron for these parts. " However, the commodore 
stood firm on the question of a copper bottom, informing Pook that "I 
prefer the copper sheathing to any mineral paint known. "is Bushnell 
got most of his changes, but Smith, true to form, made sure the 
government received the requisite price adjustment. 
In fairness to Bushnell, it should be pointed out that there were 
any number of reasons why he may have opted to substitute iron for 
brass in the steering and propulsion mechanism. The United States 
suffered from a shortage of bronze at this time. Bronze, a component of 
brass, was in high demand for the forging of cannon. Ordnance 
manufacturers in both the North and the South experimented with iron 
cannon out of necessity. Bushnell may have been forced to do the same, 
although records to indicate this are not available. Even if he could have 
gotten the bronze, and, by implication, the brass needed for the Galena, 
the delay may have jeapordized Bushnell's ability to meet the contract 
deadline, after which he might have been financially penalized. In 
other words, he might have been willing to suffer a small financial loss 
early in the process while averting a larger one when it came time for 
the government to pay the balance of the contract, Finally, Bushnell 
may have been trying to increase his profit margin on the Galena. The 
final amount deducted from the contract price, most likely for the 
substitution of iron for brass, was $2677. 76, a significant sum. That 
would have been translated into profit for Bushnell if Smith had not 
insisted on the adjustment of payment. i 
Commodore Smith retained an extremely pessimistic attitude 
throughout the Galena's construction. Even at this early stage, he 
candidly expressed his doubts about the ship to Cornelius Bushnell. In 
the midst of the squabbling over the rubber sheathing, ports, and 
rudder, he wrote Bushnell that he feared "in your eagerness to build an 
armored vessel, you did not reflect sufficiently on the many obstacles to 
be encountered, and which we now have to overcome as best we can. " 
Despite his doubts, which would continue to surface until the ship was 
successfully launched, he refused to let Bushnell use them as an excuse 
to gain extra time. For example, he notified the contractors that he was 
pressing the Navy Department "to order a Commander to the vessel at 
once to see about the fitments, as in eighty days she is to be ready for sea, 
according to contract. "zo In his zeal to protect the interests of the 
government, Smith seemed determined to hold Bushnell 5 Co. to its 
obligations, no matter what difficulties arose. As construction 
continued and other problems materialized, he would become even more 
strident, threatening financial penalties and possible abandonment of 
the project. 
The resolution of the gunport problem and the iron vs. brass issue 
came just in time for a new challenge. On November 13, Smith 
informed Bushnell that "Messrs. Griswold & Winslow propose to 
dispense with the plate over the rails on the armor of the vessel under 
your contract . . provided you will agree that such increase of weight 
which the plan they propose as a substitute. . . shall not interfere with 
or modify any of the other provisions or conditions of your contract. " 
Smith himself would agree to such a change under those conditions and 
asked Bushnell to make a decision. Strangely enough, the commodore 
did not want Pook to know that he had agreed to modify the contract. In 
a letter to Pook written the same day, he indicated to the constructor that 
"Mr. Griswold is here, and wants to change the armor, but I prefer to 
stick to the contract, except to substitute for the rubber an additional 
thickness of the iron plate outside. "2& Perhaps Smith wanted to retain 
the image of a superior fully in control of the situation and not willing to 
put up with any nonsense from a subordinate whose devotion to the 
welfare of the government may have been in question. 
Smith's wariness did not extend past Pook. The following day he 
assured a still undecided Bushnell that "if the armor of the vessel is 
destroyed, it is not your loss or your fault. " In fact, Smith liked the new 
armor better than the original plan. In a letter discussing obstacles to 
be overcome in the Galena's construction, he commented to Martin that 
"I have agreed to modify the contract as respects the armor, if the 
contractors assent to. it, which will greatly increase the resistance, and 
of which you will be informed in due time. "22 Still, the final decision 
had yet to be made, pending two conditions. First, Bushnell must agree 
to the revisions. Second, Martin, as superintendent of the armor, 
needed to examine the new plans to determine their feasibility. Smith 
fired off a barrage of letters and telegrams to settle the question once and 
for all. 
Having heard from Martin that Bushnell was coming to 
Washington, Smith telegraphed the contractor: "I will wait for you, to 
adjust our questions. " Smith, anxious to expedite the process and come 
to a firm decision, sent another telegram the following day asking 
Bushnell "Are you coming here? I wait your decision as to whether you 
agree to the change of armor as stated in my letter of the thirteenth 
instant. " The same day, Smith received the plans of the armor from 
Griswold in Troy and submitted them to Martin for inspection, 
commenting, "I think it an improvement, if the vessel will bear it. " 
However, he was not completely sold on the idea and told Martin in a 
second letter that he "probably may make some change in the form of the 
armor. " Giving form to his uncertainties, he remarked to Griswold that 
"I like the plan, but fear there will not be security enough in the heads of 
bolts as proposed. " Still expecting Bushnell in Washington, Smith 
resolved to Griswold that "if he does not come, I shall require a 
categorical answer from him on this point" of armor. Although 
flexible on an improvement that looked capable of enhancing the 
Galena's performance, Smith was going to make sure the contractor 
By November 20, the fundamentals of the design change had been 
settled, although specific details remained to be worked out. Bushnell 
sent a letter confirming his acceptance of the changes to the armor and 
Martin forwarded a telegram giving his approval of the design. Smith 
sent letters to all parties involved the next day, making the changes 
official. The improved armor, based on Griswold's design, would be 3 s 
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inches thick and composed of interlocking layers. (FIGURE 3). 
Construction could now go forward. &4 
FIGURE 3: REVISED ARMOR PLAN OF USS GALElVA 
Hull Side of Vessel 
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Smith decided to pay a visit to Mystic to check on the construction 
himself. On his return, he wrote a letter to Cornelius Bushnell and 
expressed his satisfaction at "[finding] her well put together and 
generally of good materials, so far as I could see. " However, the armor 
remained a problem. While in Mystic, Smith consulted with Pook, who 
1 
said that "the 3 s inch iron is too heavy, the vessel will not bear it. " Pook 
had obviously given the question some thought and presented Smith 
had obviously given the question some thought and presented Smith 
1 with a solution. Instead of plating the entire vessel in 3 s inch iron, he 
proposed to reduce the thickness of the plating at less vital areas of the 
ship's hull and "reduce the weight by substituting the following: From 
1 Water line to port sill 3 s inches to within 25 feet of ends; from port sill to 
1 1 rail 2 inch iron; wooden deck 2 
& inches thick covered with & inch plate; 
for 25 feet on bow and stern covered with & plate. 
" Smith, with 
customary concern, agreed, "provided such modification shall not 
change or modify any of the covenants or provisions of the contract 
except that of reducing the weight of the armor, and provided also that a 
pro rata reduction on the estimated cost of the armor be made on the 
contract price of the vessel. " Once again, the commodore consciously 
linked design modifications and financial considerations. Ever the 
pessimist, he closed the letter declaring "the vessel I fear will be behind 
time for want of the armor. "ss 
A short note to Winslow in Troy from Smith notified the 
subcontractor of the impending change, although he left it to Bushnell to 
announce the details. The commodore decided to vent his concerns at 
the main contractor, where the most good could be accomplished. After 
reminding Bushnell that he "made no proposition to change the armor; 
it came from your sub-contractors, Messrs. Winslow & Co. , " he moved to 
the crux of what he saw as a developing problem. The change in design 
meant delays. Even then, with the fundamental design decided upon, 
the thickness of the armor at various points of the hull remained up in 
the air. In a stern warning, Smith wrote Bushnell that "I hope to fix 
upon something quickly as the plan, and shall demand large forfeitures 
for every day the vessel is short of delivery over the time stipulated in the 
contract. " If that was not enough, he reminded the contractor that "the 
reduction in the weight of iron will be pro rata upon the estimated cost of 
the armor. "2 Clearly, Smith sought to head off the problem before it got 
out of hand by threatening Bushnell where it made the most difference: 
the pocketbook. 
Not content to ensure prompt delivery of the Galena by pestering 
Bushnell, the commodore shifted his sights to the armor subcontractors, 
Winslow and Griswold. Two days after his note to Bushnell, he repeated 
his threats of financial retribution to the Troy industrialists. After 
noting the changes he had discussed with Pook, he observed that "a 
small vessel will not stand a heavy armor. " The "small vessel" obviously 
being the Galena, Smith went on to repeat what he had told Bushnell: 
"If the thickness and weight of the armor be reduced, I shall deduct the 
estimated cost pro rata from the price previously agreed upon. And 
furthermore, I shall demand heavy forfeitures for delay in not 
completing the vessel within the stipulated time. " 
The available documentation does not indicate whether or not 
Bushnell and Winslow discussed Smith's letters. For whatever reason, 
Bushnell promptly responded, assuring the commodore that the vessel 
would be completed in the time specified by the contract. Smith, 
"pleased to learn" of Bushnell's promise, nonetheless promised to "fall 
back on the contract if she does not come up to the requirements. " In 
addition, he complained that Winslow had not yet submitted the revised 
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armor specifications. Bushnell sent another letter on December 10 
promising timely delivery of the Galena, to which Smith responded by 
asking again for the final plans of the plating. 
In the middle of all the wrangling over the armor, Smith lost a 
valuable ally, Daniel Martin. The limited experience of the war already 
suggested that victory might depend on the ability of the navy to reduce 
the coastal fortifications defending key Southern cities. To do so, the 
navy needed a heavily armored shallow draft vessel capable of carrying 
a few large caliber weapons to within battering range of these forts, a 
task for which the Galena would not be suited. Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles had been bombarded with designs for ironclads 
throughout the fall and winter of 1861. While most were summarily 
rejected or set aside pending further examination, the navy took a closer 
look at turreted ironclads, which seemed to meet the Union's needs. By 
the beginning of December, 1861, the Department of the Navy and 
certain members of Congress had become convinced that the navy's 
future rested with turreted coastal ironclads. 2s 
Throughout this period, the level of debate in Congress over 
ironclads steadily mounted. On December 17, Congressman Charles B. 
Sedgewick, Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, 
introduced a bill appropriating ten million dollars for the construction of 
twenty turreted ironclads based on a budget and plans drawn up by John 
Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and Engineer- 
in-Chief Benjamin Isherwood. The bill passed the House on December 
19 and moved to the Senate, where it encountered strong opposition, not 
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being passed until February 7. Anticipating the high demand for iron 
plate that must follow, the Navy Department recognized that American 
industry was still incapable of producing the volume of iron plate 
necessary to armor a sizeable number of ironclads. Secretary Welles 
therefore ordered Martin to Europe on December 21 to see if armor plate 
could be purchased in England, France, or Belgium. so 
The reason for the delay between the passage of the House and 
Senate bills rested with Lenthall and Isherwood's design. It called for 
ironclads using turrets based on the design of Captain Cowper Phipps 
Coles of the Royal Navy, which had been published in 1860. His turret 
design relied on thicker armor placed in fewer layers and had a sloping 
armored glacis to protect the base of the turret from enemy shot. 
(FIGURE 4). Ericsson and his partners viewed the introduction of this 
design with some trepidation, for it would mean both a blow to prestige 
and a loss of future contracts, Using all the power at their command, 
they forced a compromise. Ericsson's backers used their influence in 
the Senate to stall passage of the bill until a deal could be worked out 
with Secretary Welles promising that construction of the new ironclads 
would not be completed until the Monitor had been given a chance to 
prove itself. The deal also pledged that some of the new vessels would 
follow Ericsson's design, assuring his backers of ample war profits. 
The bill promptly passed upon successful completion of the 
negotiations. s~ 
FIGURE 4: COMPARISON OF TURRET DESIGNS 
~ Hull W 
Coles' Turret Design Ericssou's Turret Design 
Obviously, the machinations of the fall and winter of 1861 did not 
bode well for the Galena. In efiect, the vessel's design concept was being 
rejected before construction was ever completed. However, the situation 
was not as bleak as it might seem. First of all, Bushnell & Co. , provided 
they carried out the terms of the contract and successfully delivered the 
vessel, still stood to make a profit on the ship. Second, the Galena's 
investors, which included Bushnell, Griswold and Winslow, would not 
be cut out of future war contracts. 
Thus it is important to note that the men who invested in the 
Galena were the same men who invested in the Monitor. From a purely 
financial perspective, it did not matter which ship succeeded, as long as 
one of them did. Having assured the prospect of more Monitor-inspired 
ironclads by their intense lobbying, the investors could finish the 
Galena, take their money, and forget that the vessel had ever existed. 
Future contracts could be channeled to the same subcontractors. 
Although gloomy predictions about the Galena's future abounded, 
everyone involved with the vessel stood to gain. 
Despite the apparent lack of commitment to the Galena's design, 
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she had at least one redeeming quality that made her important to the 
Department of the Navy. Unlike the proposed ironclads, the Galena was 
partially completed and would be ready for service several months before 
the others. The Union would have to rely on her or the Monitor to 
counter the Merri mack, under construction (and surveillance) at the 
Gosport yard. Even if she was not all that the navy hoped, she was still 
an ironclad and could be expected to contribute to the war effort. 
Construction continued, still pushed and prodded along by Commodore 
Smith. 
Smith appointed Pook to take Martin's place and "attend to the 
plating of the vessel and report progress from time to time. " Reminding 
Pook of potential problems, Smith noted his "fear [that] Messrs. Winslow 
& Co. will fail in accomplishing their part of the work in the time 
specified. " On January 2, Smith requested information from Pook about 
the progress of the plating. Then, apparently not satisfied to leave 
matters in Pook's hands, the commodore appointed M. Minthorne of 
New York City "superintendent of the engine, &c. , as well as the plating 
for the ironclad vessel building at Mystic, Connecticut. " Smith 
instructed Minthorne to journey to Mystic, examine the Galena, and 
"report progress to this Bureau. " The same day, he apprised Pook of the 
change and expressed confidence in Minthorne's abilities, noting "he is 
a man of experience and knows all about the business. Confer with 
him; his advice will be valuable. "ss 
Meanwhile, the plating of the vessel continued. Pook reported on 
January 6 "that there is now about 3 feet in height on both sides of the 
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vessel fore and aft, of the first thickness. " Juan Patterson, an 
Englishman with a solid background in ironworking, supervised the 
sixty men assigned to the task by Winslow R Co. Minthorne 
corroborated Pook's statement two days later, noting that "the parties 
doing the job seem to have provided themselves with the necessary force, 
furnaces, tools, Rc. , to expedite the work. " Even Bushnell got into the 
act, writing with some enthusiasm: "I was at Mystic attending to the 
progress of the plating yesterday, and am happy to assure you that it is 
now a fixed fact that the plan of putting the iron on is a perfect ~cess 
so far as ~r~ig and gggg~rn g is concerned, but as to cost and 
time, there is not much to be said I fear. "ss 
Smith seemingly ignored all but the last of Bushnell's letter. 
Responding with a less than cheerful message of his own, he cautioned 
Bushnell: "I would remind you that the time for completing your vessel 
under the contract expires on the 27th instant, aAer which, if she is not 
ready, I may demand heavy forfeitures for delay. " Then, in an effort to 
move things along, he asked the contractor to "notify me when the vessel 
will be ready for the guns. " The same day, he wrote Minthorne and 
informed him of the time obligation, remarking that "if the vessel is not 
completed in that time, the contractors are liable for liquidated 
damages, which the government may demand. "s4 
Bushnell got the message. He dashed off a letter to the 
commodore explaining that he, Winslow and Griswold were headed to 
Mystic for a personal inspection of the situation and that he would 
forward a report of what they found as soon as they returned. In the 
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meantime, he appealed to Smith for understanding; 
In regard to our being a few days behind our time, which I most 
surely regret to say is now possible on account of delay in plating 
only, we can give three very good reasons why you will not be 
likely to demand any forfeiture, but will not now suggest them, as 
we are determined to do our best and have the fullest confidence 
that you will see that the government does right in the case. ss 
Smith was not impressed by the cryptic "three very good reasons" and 
sent back a typically pragmatic response. Once again, he reaffirmed the 
government's resolve, noting "as regards the delay in completing your 
vessel the Bureau has no discretion but to exact a full compliance with 
the terms of the contract. " Probably reflecting the Navy Department's 
concern over the Merrimack, he warned that "the loss of time is a 
matter of serious consideration to the government. " 
By January 16, Minthorne reported "there is on the vessel at 
present about forty-five tons of armor, twenty-eight tons first course and 
seventeen covering course. The parties say the whole amount is 
delivered; from the estimate I could make I should consider their 
estimate reliable. " In his opinion, "the job cannot be finished by the 
twenty-seventh of January, " but he thought "all possible efforts are being 
made to fulfill the contract. " Indeed, a significant portion of the 
construction was finished. Pook reported on January 21 that "the 
carpenter's work upon the hull is about completed, with the exception of 
such work as may be required by the engineers. " However, haunting 
questions remained, especially about the armor. The contractors were 
still not sure how much armor the ship would bear and wanted to wait 
until after she was launched before determining the final load. Smith 
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vetoed this idea, perhaps considering it a ploy to avoid paying penalties 
for delayed delivery, and reminded Pook that "the contractor is 
responsible for the completion and successful performance of the vessel, 
and must decide as to the weight of the armor to be put on her ~fore 
launching. " Furthermore, voicing his skepticism of the ship' s 
structural stability, he told Pook to "have sights arranged along the sides 
of the vessel and amidship fore and aft, to ascertain how much the sides 
settle, if any, after the shores are knocked away, and how much her 
shape is changed, if any, after launching. "s~ 
The armor was not the only part of the vessel confounded by delays 
and confusion. The engines also provided their share of problems 
during construction. They were subcontracted to the Delamater Iron 
Works of New York City, the same firm responsible for building the 
Monitor's machinery. Founded in 1850 by Peter Hogg and Cornelius 
Delamater as Hogg 8z Delamater, these works made their reputation for 
their ability to manufacture heavy machinery and cylinders for steam 
engines. Hogg had retired in 1855 and Delamater bought him out, 
changing the name to Delamater Iron Works. Delamater proved to be a 
capable administrator, and the company's reputation for quality work 
increased even further. ss 
Delamater's success resulted from more than his administrative 
and mechanical prowess. His extensive network of friends included 
John Ericsson, whom he had known since 1839, and Cornelius 
Bushnell. Ericsson and Delamater were so close that "rarely. . . did 
either of them enter upon a business venture without consulting the 
other. " Delamater gave Ericsson free rein around the iron works, 
allowing him to try out his ideas. In return, Delamater had 
unrestricted access to Ericsson's designs for his own projects. 
Delamater had set up the initial meeting between the Swedish inventor 
and Bushnell when the latter was concerned about the Galena's stability 
during the summer of 1861. Delamater's association with Bushnell and 
his circle of politically connected friends no doubt helped increase his 
chances of securing war contracts, of which he had several more than 
his fair share. ss 
Samuel Pook had welcomed Smith's directive appointing 
Minthorne as superintendent of the engines, "as that portion of the work 
needs driving more than any other at present. " Pook had given little or 
no attention to their construction, for Minthorne was able to report two 
days later that "I have visited Mr. Dellemater's [sic] and seen the 
engines, boilers, &c. The principal parts of the engines are together and 
the rest in such a state of forwardness as to make all nearly ready for 
shipment. " The only parts of the engine Minthorne did not see were the 
boilers, but he thought they were "well advanced and not likely to cause 
detention. "4o 
Bushnell planned to have the engines built at Delamater and then 
shipped to Mystic, where they would be installed on the vessel as soon as 
construction permitted. Keeping Smith's admonitions in mind, this 
seemed to be a prudent plan for speeding up the construction process in 
any way possible. By January 16, Minthorne could "report that the 
arrival of bed plates, cylinders and portions of engines necessary to the 
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commencement of erection, was daily expected, and that the machinists 
to do the work were there. " Still, the January 27 deadline for the 
launching of the Galena was rapidly approaching. Six days before the 
deadline, Pook could only write that "most of the engine is here upon the 
wharf' at Mystic, although the boilers remained unfinished in New 
York at the Delamater Iron Works. Obviously, the engine could not be 
installed until the hull was ready. By February 8, the constructor 
reported "the bed plates for engine is about ready for bolting to the 
keelsons. "4~ Perhaps the pace of construction would now accelerate. 
At this critical juncture, Minthorne was taken off the project 
because of other commitments. Smith turned over the supervision of the 
armor plate to Pook, asking him "to do the best you can for the interest of 
the government. " Pook was a logical choice. Although the commodore 
had doubted Pook's ability to carry out this type of task earlier in the 
building period, the constructor was the only person capable of stepping 
in at this late date and understanding the complexities of the ship' s 
construction. The need for greater urgency was obvious; the vessel 
should have been launched on January 27 and Smith grew restive as the 
first week of February passed. On February 8, Pook wrote "that the 
gunboat now building at this place will probably be launched on Friday, 
the 14th instant. " Two days later he asked Smith to "give the contractors 
two payments upon the armor, " but Smith had had enough. Having 
given up on remonstrances, the piqued administrator turned to the one 
tool of persuasion Bushnell & Co. would have no trouble 
comprehending: money. With what must have been some degree of 
satisfaction, he replied to Pook that "the Department has decided to 
make no further payments to the contractors until the vessel shall have 
been completed and accepted. "4s 
Smith later relented on part of his threat to cut off payments. 
Acting on Pook's suggestion to pay Griswold and Winslow "provided no 
other payment has been made" for the remainder of the vessel, he 
ordered funds released on February 15 to pay for the armor put on the 
vessel to date. However, the government still withheld a substantial 
portion of the contract price, pending successful completion and testing 
of the vessel. Through the end of January Bushnell & Co. had only been 
paid $60, 000, with an additional $20, 000 held back as required by the 
contract. 4s Thus, the government retained control of $155, 250 promised 
to the contractors for the finished ironclad, giving it powerful leverage in 
this situation. 
Construction continued at Mystic, spurred on by the government's 
withholding of funds. On February 14, Bushnell telegraphed to Smith 
"the ship is safely and successfully launched. . . Stability all right. " He 
optimistically predicted to the commodore that the "ship will prove a 
success. " Pook followed up with an equally positive assessment of the 
launching. The vessel, with "her armor on to the port sills" and "90 tons 
of machinery on board, " showed "no changes which can be measured" 
in the shape of her hull after launching. Like Bushnell, Pook 
confidently declared "I have no doubt in my own mind of the eventual 
success of this ship. "44 The validity of this statement awaited the test of 
battle. 
The launching of the vessel did not end Commodore Smith's 
problems with the contractors. Only part of the armor plating was 
affixed and the engines had yet to be installed. However, the ship was 
finally in the water, a positive step which must have been appreciated by 
the frustrated commodore. The last six months had required him to 
play a curious brand of diplomacy in which he tried to hurry along the 
ship's construction while protecting the interests of the government 
from a contractor who at times either appeared not to understand what 
he had gotten himself into or else seemed intent on increasing his profit 
margin on the Galena. It must be remembered that the agonies of the 
Galena's construction process represented only one third of Smith's 
work load. His responsibilities also called for overseeing construction of 
the Monitor and New Ironsides. In each case he dealt with a similar 
network of contractors and subcontractors. 
No matter how frustrating Smith's job was, the realities of the 
developing conflict put the Galena's construction into perspective and 
reminded the commodore of the larger end for which he must strive. 
Increasing concern over the renovation of the Merrimack and the 
urgent call for ironclad warships from General George Brinton 
McClellan during the spring of 1862 would force Smith to keep up the 
pressure on Bushnell & Co. Although the ship was in the water, much 
work remained to get her ready for combat, and though increasingly 
tired of the whole process, it was to this task that Smith turned in the 
next two months. 
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CHAPTER 1V 
"I HAD BEGUN TO REGARD HER AS A MYTH" 
The frustrations which had bedeviled Commodore Joseph Smith 
throughout the construction process did not let up once the vessel had 
been launched. Much work remained to be done, including the affixing 
of the rest of the armor and the installation of the power plant. 
Unfortunately, neither step would go easily, demonstrating the type of 
problem inherent in American ironclad construction at the time. Once 
again, the armor would undergo changes, although not in design this 
time. The engines would require more time to put in than earlier 
anticipated. These changes and delays resulted in a steady pushing 
back of the Galena's delivery date to the navy, which incensed the 
commodore and brought dire promises of financial retribution. The 
navy desperately needed its ironclads; rumors of the Merrimack's 
impending launching sent nervous shivers down the spines of officers 
in Washington and on the blockading squadron responsible for closing 
off Chesapeake Bay. Even though the Galena missed its chance to take 
on the Confederate behemoth, military officers recognized the 
psychological effect of having another ironclad on station. From 
February until early April, Smith kept up pressure on the contractors 
until he had what he wanted: delivery of the Galena to the navy. 
The launching of the Galena allowed Smith to include another 
oversight mechanism into the construction process. During the middle 
of January, he had "applied for a commander for the vessel" to take her 
through the final stages of fitting out. i The navy assigned Commander 
Alfred Taylor to the task. He was a capable officer, having been in the 
navy since 1825. Smith sent him "a copy of the contract which you will 
see is complied with so far as her equipments, stores and outfits are 
concerned. Upon your certificate upon these points and upon her 
performance will depend the final payment to the contractors. "z While 
maintaining the stern demeanor that typified Smith's behavior during 
the preceding months in his letter to Taylor, the commodore revealed his 
momentary relief over the vessel's launching by authorizing Samuel 
Pook, the naval constructor, "one week's leave of absence" as soon as his 
duties would permit. s 
Meanwhile, progress continued on the Galena. The shipyard at 
Mystic installed the rest of her engine, minus the boilers, and more of 
the armor plating. Pook reported that "the contractors inform me that 
they have engaged a steamer to tow this ship to New York on Saturday 
next, to take on her boilers and the deck plating. "4 The unfinished 
vessel departed as planned, at three o' clock in the afternoon. It is 
doubtful whether anyone paid much attention to the movement of this 
partially finished experiment. National attention was riveted on 
Richmond, Virginia, where JefFerson Davis took the oath of office as 
President of the Confederate States of America. At the same time, the 
Union formally celebrated the birthday of George Washington. s 
The Galena was destined "for Rowland's shipyard, at Green 
Point, L[ong] I[sland]. "s There she would finish building, taking on her 
remaining machinery, armor, stores, and supplies. "Rowland's 
shipyard" was actually the Continental Iron Works, owned and operated 
by Thomas Fitch Rowland. Located near the East River, the Continental 
Iron Works was "a comparatively new establishment, " less than two 
years old. Rowland, like many of his contemporaries, started as an 
apprentice in a machine shop, where he learned the basics of his trade, 
He worked on the steamboat Connecticut for two years and then 
"obtained a job with the Allaire Works of New York, an old established 
engine-building concern. " After working there a year, he left to become 
an independent designer and builder of steam engines in New York for 
the next six years. He founded the Continental Iron Works with Samuel 
Sneden in 1859, but their relationship ended one year later, with 
Rowland retaining control of the company. 7 
Since the outbreak of the Civil War, Rowland had been engaged in 
the "manufacture of Gun Carriages and Mortar Beds for the Navy 
Department, and fitted out most of the steamers purchased from the 
merchant service which took part in the capture of Port Royal, and all of 
the vessels composing the 'Porter Mortar Fleet. '" His Continental Iron 
Works was chosen by John Ericsson to build the Moni tor's hull in 
October, 1861, a vessel whose construction Smith was also hurrying 
along in anticipation of the Merrimack's appearance. However, the 
Monitor had been launched almost a month earlier and had left the 
Continental Iron Works on February 19, allowing Rowland and his men 
to concentrate on the Galena. s Indeed, the navy's leadership eagerly 
awaited the new ironclads. Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough, 
commanding the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, wrote Assistant 
Secretary Gustavus Vasa Fox that "I hope the Dept. will be able to send 
the Ericsson soon to Hampton Roads to grapple with the Merrimac k lay 
her out as cold as a wedge. She, & another like her, would do the work 
well. "s 
By February 28, Pook could report progress on several key 
components of the Galena. He noted that "the deck is being plated, and 
that part of the work will probably be completed in ten or twelve working 
days, " although "the plating on the sides is rapidly approaching 
completion. " In addition, the "boilers are to be placed on board 
tomorrow" and "most of the machinery will be on board next week. " 
Evidently Pook was uncertain of his ability to set up the machinery, 
because the constructor asked Smith to send an engineer to supervise 
the final installation. ~o Smith promptly responded, appointing John 
Farron, the navy's Chief Engineer, as "superintendent of the engine and 
its erection on the ironclad gunboat Galena now at Green Point. "&& Like 
his predecessors, Farron received a set of instructions from the Bureau 
of Yards and Docks which enclosed the original specifications and noted 
the modifications which had been made during the course of 
construction. In closing, Smith told the new engineer that "I want the 
vessel, and wish the workmen to work night and day. "~s 
Throughout the ship's construction, the nature of her armament 
had been debated within the Navy Department. By early January, Smith 
reported to Pook that "four IX inch Dahlgren guns and two 80 lb. rifled 
cannon are proposed for the armament. "&s The basic arrangement had 
not changed by the middle of February, although it was not sure 
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whether there would be "four or six IX inch broadside guns" placed on 
board. Regardless of number, the Galena had more than enough ports 
available. ~4 By the end of the month, the Department had decided on 
"four IX inch Dahlgren guns, and two 80 lb. rifled cannon, unless 
otherwise ordered. us After some scrambling around and desperate 
searching, Commander Andrew A. Harwood of the Ordnance Bureau 
was able to procure two of the new 100 pounder Parrott rifles and the 
necessary mounting carriages. 
FIGURE 5: CROSS SECTION OF DAHLGREN GUN 
The nine inch Dahlgren gun had been developed in 1850 by John 
A. Dahlgren, working in the Bureau of Ordnance. This design, shaped 
like a soda bottle, could contain the tremendous inner pressures 
required for heavy ordnance. (FIGURE 5l. Manufactured in nine, 
eleven, fifteen, and twenty-inch sizes during the Civil War, Dahlgren's 
design proved more than a match for its European counterparts. ~s In 
the war's last year, Norman Wiard, an ordnance expert testifying before 
Congress, justly claimed that "the Dahlgren gun has exhibited better 
endurance in proof than any other large gun" in service. i7 In response 
to a query asking what was "the best gun now known, " Assistant 
Secretary Fox offered a similar opinion, declaring that "the best shell 
gun is Admiral Dahlgren's nine and eleven inch guns. "is 
FIGURE 6: CROSS SECTION OF PARRCYIT RIFLE 
L. . . . 
The Ordnance Bureau chose to put Parrott rifled cannon on board 
the Galena. Invented by Robert C. Parrott, this type of cannon was 
"composed of a cast-iron cylinder with a wrought-iron jacket or band 
shrunk upon the breech of the gun, in order to strengthen it about the 
seat of discharge. "is (FIGURE 6). Although the largest sizes of this type 
of gun were prone to burst when fired with explosive shells, it was 
considered by its contemporaries to be the best rifled cannon available. 
According to American steel maker Alexander Holley, "the gun is 
cheap, and has proved very serviceable. . . It is intended, not to exhaust 
the capabilities of the system of initial tension, but to utilize that system 
as far as possible without greatly increasing the cost of the standard 
ordnance and without serious risk of damage by exposure and 
maltreatment in the hands of green artillerists. "z 
The dual armament had been chosen by the Ordnance Bureau for 
very practical reasons. Each cannon had different effects at different 
distances. Captain Henry A. Wise explained the difference to the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War in 1864: 
The rifled gun has the greater range, but the ball from the 
smoothbore starts with the greater velocity. In other words, the 
rifled projectile retains its flight longer than the smooth-bore ball. 
The effect which projectiles produce is different under varying 
circumstances. The rifled gun, with its projectile, can cut away 
masonry or brick-work. The round shot has a smashing power, 
and at a certain range, with its high velocity, it can penetrate as 
well as smash. && 
Captain S. V. Benet, who had carried out a number of tests at Parrott's 
foundry during the war, offered a similar opinion to the committee. In 
his opinion, at a range of 1000 yards or less, "for use against ironclads 
[the Dahlgren's) smashing efFect would render it more effective than a 
rifled gun. " However, the rifled cannon's greater accuracy at distances 
exceeding 1000 yards made the addition of such guns necessary to the 
existing smoothbore armament of warships like the Galena. 
Just when it seemed that the Galena's construction had been 
brought under control, two new crises occurred, both at about the same 
time. The first dealt with the vessel's armor plating. Commodore 
Smith received an emphatic letter from John F. Winslow on March 6 
requesting permission to alter the placement of armor on the ship' s 
hull. In it, Winslow extolled the merits of the rail and plate armor 
which covered most of the hull, noting "where this sort of armor is on 
the ship it is the most beautiful and perfect that can be conceived, and 
1 
afFords 3 4 inch protection against shot. " However, where this armor 
ended, "20 feet aft from the stem, and 14 feet forward of the stern post, " 
1 
2 inch boiler plates had been affixed to the hull. Winslow declared "that 
1 
this 2 inch iron affords precious little protection against shot, and 
besides is so unsightly compared with the rest of the armor that it ~ou ht 
M ~ ggrmi~t + ~rm i . " Indeed, "you will at once perceive that if 
1 
the s plates are allowed to remain on the ship, that in the event of her 
presenting her bows to the shot of an enemy, they will be sure to be 
penetrated, and as the magazines are well forward, they would be 
greatly endangered. "~s 
Noting that Pook had fifty tons displacement to spare, and that 
replacing the boiler plate with iron planking would only add eleven tons 
to the Galena, Winslow requested Smith's approval for the changes. 
Anticipating the commodore's reaction, he admitted "it is true we have 
incurred much of the expense of putting on the plates, but we will allow 
the government the weight of them against the same amount of bars, 
and only charge for the work already expended in fitting them, and in 
addition the extra weight of the bars, and putting them on the ship. " 
Winslow justified the increased expense by noting that "this extra cost to 
the government will be but a trifle compared with the superior protection 
afforded by the bars, and their greatly improved appearance. " Not only 
would the Galena fight better, but she would also look better. 24 
Commodore Smith decided to write Pook about the impending 
change and see if he had any objections. After referring to Winslow's 
proposition, Smith opined that "the Bureau prefers the change if it does 
not increase the displacement of the vessel beyond that provided for in 
the contract, the difference in cost to be settled with the contractor. " He 
asked the constructor for "your views on the subject. "ss At the same 
time, he replied to Winslow, stating that "I have no objection to 
continuing the bars from stem to stern if the contractors agree to it" and 
it did not make too great a change in the ship's displacement. 2 A 
telegram went out to the Busbnells two days later from the Bureau 
agreeing to the changes, with Smith hoping "it will not delay the 
vessel. "27 
As concerned as Smith might appear, the main reason for 
hurrying the Galena's construction along had been partially alleviated. 
The Merrimack steamed out of Norfolk on March 8 and delivered a 
crippling blow to the wooden Union blockading vessels in Hampton 
Roads. She sank the Cumberland, blew up the Congress, and damaged 
several other warships before retreating back to the protection of 
Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point. Her officers planned to bring 
her out the next day and finish the job. However, late that night, the 
Monitor arrived, leading to the epic battle of Hampton Roads the 
following morning. Although neither ship won, the Monitor prevented 
the Merrimack from wreaking havoc on the Union fleet, breaking the 
blockade, and, in the minds of some government officials, threatening 
Washington itself. Although the menace was not removed, it was 
contained. ss However, pressure on Smith to get the Galena ready for 
battle remained. A few days after the Battle of Hampton Roads, a 
nervous Goldsborough, concerned about the ability of the Monitor to 
withstand another foray by the Merri mack, wrote Fox: "Would to God 
we had another iron clad vessel on hand! Cannot something more be 
done to hurry up the Mystic, or whatever her name may be. " 
Shortly after the Galena's launching, Bushnell wrote an 
optimistic letter to Smith lauding the vessel's abilities. "It is very 
natural, " he noted, "that I should be pleased with the success of our 
Mystic steamer in her every part. But I can assure you that every one, 
competent and incompetent to judge, are unanimous in their praise of 
her in all particulars. . . Her speed, appearance, power to punish rebels 
and all enemies of the country are now unquestioned. "so Unfortunately, 
Bushnell's views were not shared by all. James Strong, a prominent 
New Yorker and volunteer officer in the Union army, visited the ship 
one month later. He described his reaction to Smith: 
I, with several gentlemen, went on board the ironclad gunboat 
Mystic now lying in Green Point, and in our opinion, and also the 
opinion of several ship builders, was that the ship was not worth 
the materials that were in her before she was put together. Any 
schooner in the port of New York is stronger than she. A 32 
pound shot will smash her in. The knees are about 10 feet apart 
and small at that, and her timber entirely too light; she can' t 
stand ten minutes before any vessel of ordinary strength. Appoint 
a proper person to examine, and you will find what I say is true 
and unless she is made stronger, she is worse than nothing. » 
The reply to Strong's letter is not extant, but this report must have raised 
doubts in Smith's mind about the venture. 
The only other change to the armament was proposed by Smith 
himself. The commodore wrote John Winslow on March 14 and asked 
about the possibility of attaching a ram to the Galena's bow. The 
original plan carried no such provision and Smith's request can be 
attributed to the Merrimack's effective use of her ram against the 
Cumberland at Hampton Roads on March 8. The ungainly Confederate 
ironclad had easily disposed of the Union vessel, although snapping off 
her ram in the process. Winslow discussed Smith's query with John 
Ericsson and Pook. Together, they decided that the Galena's bow was 
strong enough to serve as a ram if necessary, but "that in her present 
forward state toward completion, the proposed iron horn or prow cannot 
be put on so as to be entirely safe against breaking when used. Besides, 
its preparation and application would seriously delay getting her ready 
for sea. "ss That was enough for Smith. He informed the engineers that 
"the ram is abandoned" on March 21. ss 
As if the change to the armor, and the resulting delay, was not 
enough, the installation of the boilers became a problem. Based on 
information from the Continental Iron Works, probably from Pook, 
Smith fired off a letter to Bushnell & Co. on March 6. In it, he chastised 
the contractor calling "the slow progress of the Galena. . . 
unaccountable. . . The boilers were not in the vessel yesterday. " 
Reverting to the strategy which seemed to work so well earlier, the 
commodore threatened that he would "claim heavy damages for this 
delay. "S4 Bushnell quickly replied by trying to shift the blame to the 
whims of nature. He claimed "our engines and boilers have been ready 
for a long time, and the reason for the delay, as given by the Captain of 
the Derrick, was the impossibility of handling them safely during the 
continuous gale of last week. " Calmer weather permitted the placing of 
the equipment on board two days earlier. The contractor went on to 
declare that "it cannot be possible that the government will add to the 
great loss thereby sustained, by demanding damages, especially when it 
is fully known that what has caused a large part of the delay has added 
immensely to the real value of the steamer in general appearance, as 
well as power of resistance in her plating. "ss The argument did not 
impress Smith, who once again was growing skeptical of the changes 
and delays. 
On March 19, Cornelius Bushnell reported back to Smith that the 
workers at the Continental Iron Works "are getting along as fast as I 
expected, taking into account the change of plate both foreward and aft. " 
He informed the commodore that "the trial trip and day of delivery to the 
government is fixed unchangeably for two weeks from to-day. "ss Smith 
was unimpressed and impatient. Ignoring Bushnell's attempt to 
placate him with a delivery date, he plunged to the heart of the problem: 
"Please state what delays the Galena. Is it the engine or the plating? I 
1 
would not have taken off the 
z inch plates, if I had supposed that it 
would cause delay. I was informed that it was the engine which was 
behind hand. "s7 In another letter written the same day, he chastised 
the contractor for the delivery date, complaining, "Now you state two 
weeks more are required! Why, no one can count the damage to the 
government for this extraordinary delay. "ss Smith was clearly getting 
frustrated. 
During the exchange of letters, Bushnell unwittingly gave Smith 
a chance to score a moral victory, which the commodore promptly seized 
upon. On March 18, Bushnell submitted "a proposal" for another 
ironclad "that I trust the public exigencies will not induce you to accept, 
as I have care, ~en. ~ur, moonm, gllo ~nh. But with all this, I may 
have boldness and means that you can use to help save the nation; if so 
gLl, nil is at your service. "ss Bushnell wanted to take another hull that 
he had building and turn it into an ironclad "all complete for action in 
sixty days. " In a letter to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, he 
suggested using the same armor plan as that used for the Galena, 
because "this mode of armor can be applied more rapidly than any 
other, plates or bars, and is in my opinion much superior to any that can 
be conceived. " Anticipating questions about problems with the Galena's 
armor, he noted that "the delay in putting it on the Galena arose from 
want of experience, which difficulty is now overcome, and the necessity 
of fitting the outer and inner bars. "4o He offered to build the new vessel 
for three hundred thousand dollars. 
Welles sent the proposal to Smith, who would ultimately decide 
whether or not to proceed with it. Smith wrote back to Bushnell, 
informing him that if any vessel were built, it would have to be smaller 
than the industrialist's proposal. With obvious relish, he offered his 
opinion that "if the time consumed in building the Galena is an evidence 
of your ability and promptness, it would require near four months, 
instead of sixty days, to complete the vessel if your proposition were 
adopted. "4~ Bushnell got the message, writing back to the commodore 
that "I am glad you did not accept my 60 days offer, but you had no right 
to touch on facts in regard to the time it has taken to plate the Galena, in 
consideration that it is enough to make a man sick to think of it. "42 
Smith must have felt better knowing he was not the only person 
frustr'ated by the delays and changes. 
Commander Taylor, on the scene at the Continental Iron Works, 
could only inform Smith "that it is impossible to say with certainty 
whether the armor or the engine will delay the Galena. " Engineer 
Farron predicted "at least two weeks before the engine will be ready. "4s 
Although installation of the armor seemed to be proceeding 
satisfactorily, the contractors were encountering some problems with 
the weather. On this particular day, a heavy snowfall made work 
difficult. Meanwhile, Bushnell promised Smith two days later that "you 
shall have the Galena next week all complete. " Still obviously frustrated 
with the whole project, he decided to go the New York himself "and see 
that there is no slip this time, and that everything is provided to your 
satisfaction. "44 This was just as well, because Farron had written 
Smith on the same day that "the presence of the contractor or some 
person to act for him, would expedite the work materially. "4s As things 
presently stood, Farron was not nearly as optimistic as Bushnell about 
the prospects of finishing the Galena in less than two weeks. 
Bushnell hurried to New York to oversee construction and 
reported that "if we do not have continuous bad weather, as we have had 
most of the time since our arrival, we will deliver her at the Navy Yard 
next Wednesday, [April 2], all but complete. "4s Bushnell then engaged 
in a little politicking in an effort to assuage the testy commodore: 
My prediction of some months since that you would not only save 
your reputation, but put posterity forever under a debt of obligation 
to you for your untiring efforts in the work of providing the 
Monitor, to say nothing of the Galena, which is ~esti~n to run 
NIL a d~dt the~~~l. I Il toy 
mind, and you will allow me to suggest now that you have taken 
all said risk, and certain facts and principles are demonstrated, 
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and your ~rar is sure. Let some one else take the risk and get 
the ~e' if ~hr ~i ~n in some of the new 1000 inventions. 47 
Smith was not disposed to Bushnell's flattery. The same day he 
grumbled to Farron that "I am tired of the delay in completing this 
vessel. "4s 
Engineer Farron talked to Samuel Pook, still engaged in working 
on the ship, about the delays and Smith's frustration. Pook wrote Smith 
and expressed regret "that it has appeared to you that I have not done 
my best. " First, he blamed Delamater for slowing down construction by 
insisting that the vessel be brought to New York to receive her boilers. 
He also faulted Griswold and Winslow for late delivery of the iron 
plating, noting "I am aware that more men could have been put on the 
armor, but what can be done when the material is not at hand. " In 
closing, he begged Smith to "not blame me, sir; I have done all I could 
from the beginning. I shall inform Mr. Bushnell to-day that the 
government holds him responsible for this delay, and he must see that 
men enough are put upon the ship immediately to finish the ship 
without more delay. "4s 
The latest deadline for the Galena's delivery came and went 
without word from Bushnell. On April 3, Smith dashed off a short letter 
to the contractor saying "I have almost abandoned the hope of receiving 
the Galena. " His disgust was plainly evident, and he promised that "as 
to charges for extras, you will find the government's claim for damages 
more than an offset to the account even if the vessel shall prove 
satisfactory. "so At last, Smith could take it no longer. Writing to one of 
Rowland's associates, Henry R. Dunham, he made it clear that "the 
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Galena is wanted for service immediately. She is at best only an 
experiment, and it is not deemed advisable to incur further expense or 
risk of delay preparing her for service. "si Finally, after almost two more 
weeks of construction, Bushnell delivered the vessel to the navy, still 
unfinished, on April 15, 1862. Smith could only "rejoice to hear that the 
Galena is at last in our hands. I had begun to regard her as a myth. " 
Somewhat facetiously, he suggested to Bushnell that "I hope you will 
make a trip in her. "ss 
Although the vessel was not completely finished, she had been 
delivered to the navy, which meant she was one step closer to her 
ultimate test: contact with the enemy. Smith would continue to haggle 
with Bushnell Br. Co. about whether or not the terms of the contract had 
been fulfilled and what penalties, if any, should be exacted for 
construction delays and design failures. Still, despite all the bluster and 
remonstrances, the United States Navy now possessed its second coastal 
ironclad. The reputation of ironclad technology, especially after the 
fight at Hampton Roads, meant that the Galena would serve as much as 
a psychological weapon as she would an actual physical threat to 
Confederate forces. Even though she was still untested in battle, she 
was an ironclad, and her presence alone would bolster Union morale in 
the Chesapeake and cast doubts among the enemy about their ability to 
resist. Therefore, the navy quickly moved to prepare her for active duty. 
CHAPTER 1V NOTES 
tCommodore Joseph Smith to M. Minthorne, January 17, 1862. 
Subject File, U. S. Navy 1775-1910, AD - Design and General 
Characteristics 1860-1910, Ironclads, Correspondence relative to, 
between Commodore Joseph Smith & various Designers and Builders. 
1861 to 1863, Record Group 45, Box 51, National Archives, Washington, 
D. C. (Hereinafter cited as Correspondence Relative to Ironclads). 
2Smith to Commander Alfred Taylor, February 15, 1862. Ibid. 
sSmith to Samuel H. Pook, February 17, 1862. Ibid. 
4Pook to Smith, February 18, 1862. Ibid. The following Saturday 
was February 22. 
sEverette Beach Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 
1861-1865 (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1971; reprint ed. , New York: 
Da Capo Press, 1985), 174. 
sPook to Smith, February 22, 1862. Correspondence Relative to 
Ironclads. 
7J. Leander Bishop, A History of American Manufactures From 
1608 to 1860, 3rd ed. , 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Edward Young & Co. , 1868; 
reprint ed. , New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), III:132-33; 
Dictionary of American Biography, 20 vols. (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1928-1936), XVI:200. 
sBishop, History of American Manufactures, III:133; William C. 
Davis, Duel Between the First Ironclads (New York: Doubleday, 1975; 
reprint ed. , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 47-52, 
sAdmiral Louis M. Goldsborough to Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, February 23, 1862, in Gustavus Vase Fox, 
Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, 1861-1865, edited by Robert Means Thompson and Richard 
Wainwright. 2 vols. (New York: De Vinne Press, 1918-1919), I:244. 
OPook to Smith, February 28, 1862. Correspondence Relative to 
Ironclads. 
t~Smith to John Farron, February 28, 1862. Ibid. 
~2Smith to Farron, March 11, 1862, Ibid. 
tsSmith to Pook, January 7, 1862. Ibid. 
~4Smith to Taylor, February 15, 1862. Ibid. 
tsSmith to Captain Andrew A. Harwood, February 25, 1862. Ibid. 
tsDavid K. Allison, "John A. Dahlgren: Innovator in Uniform, " 
in Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval 
Tradition 1840-1880, ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986), 33-35. 
~7U. S. , Congress, Senate, Letter on Heavy Guns, Senate Misc. 
Doc. 47, 38th Cong. , 2nd sess. , 1865, p. 3. 
i U. S. , Congress, Senate, Character, Efficiency, Fabrication, etc. 
of Heavy Ordnance Now in Use, Senate Rept. 121, 38th Cong. , 2nd sess. , 
1864-1865, p. 170. 
&sibid. 
, 2. 
Alexander Holley, A Treatise on Ordnance and Armor: 
Embracing Descriptions, Discussions, and Professional Opinions 
Concerning the Material, Fabrication, Requirements, Capabilities, and 
Endurance of European and American Guns for Naval, Sea-Coast, and 
Iron-Clad Warfare. And Their Rifling, Projectiles, and Breech- 
Loading, Also, Results of Experiments Against Armor, From Official 
Records with an Appendix, Referring to Gun-Cotton, Hooped Guns, 
Etc. , Etc. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865), 53. The "system of initial 
tension" referred to by Holley refers to the method of attaching the 
wrought-iron jacket to the barrel. The cross section of the Parrott rifled 
is adapted from p. 51 of Holley's text. 
2iCharacter, Efficiency, Fabrication, etc. of Heavy Ordnance Now 
in Use, 27. 
22Ibid. 
, 39. 
2s John F. Winslow to Smith, March 6, 1862. Correspondence 
Relative to Ironclads. 
s41bid. 
Smith to Pook, March 8, 1862, Ibid. 
ssSmith to Winslow, March 8, 1862. Ibid. 
Smith to C. S. Bushnell tk Co. , March 10, 1862. Ibid. 
2SDavis, Duel Betiveen the First Ironclads, 76-137. 
Goldsborough to Fox, March 16, 1862, in Fox, Confidential 
Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, I:249. Smith had personal 
reasons for pushing the Galena's completion. His son, Joseph, Jr. , was 
killed while commanding the Congress against the Merri mack. 
Bushnell to Smith, February 18, 1862. Correspondence Relative 
to Ironclads. 
sr James Strong to Smith, March 12, 1862. Ibid. 
ssWinslow to Smith, March 18, 1862. Ibid. 
ssSmith to Taylor, March 21, 1862. Ibid. 
s4Smith to Bushnell, March 6, 1862. Ibid. 
ssBushnell to Smith, March 8, 1862. Ibid. 
Bushnell to Smith, March 19, 1862. Ibid. 
Smith to Bushnell, March 21, 1862. Ibid. 
ssSmith to Bushnell, March 21, 1862. Ibid. 
ssBushnell to Smith, March 18, 1862. Ibid. 
4oBushnell to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, March 18, 
1862. Ibid. 
4~Smith to Bushnell, March 20, 1862. Ibid. 
4sBushnell to Smith, March 22, 1862. Ibid. 
4sTaylor to Smith, March 22, 1862. Ibid. 
44Bushnell to Smith, March 24, 1862. Ibid, 
4sFarron to Smith, March 24, 1862. Ibid. 
4sBushnell to Smith, March 25, 1862. Ibid. 
4~Bushnell to Smith, March 25, 1862. Ibid. 
4sSmith to Farron, March 25, 1862. Ibid. 
~sPook to Smith, March 27, 1862. Ibid. 
soSmith to Bushnell, April 3, 1862. Ibid. 
stSmith to Henry IL Dunham, April 4, 1862. Ibid. 
s Smith to Bushnell, April 16, 1862. Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
'WE DEMONSTRATED THAT SHE IS NOT SHOTPROOF ' 
Commodore Joseph Smith's efforts had finally borne fruit. 
Delivery of the Galena came at a critical time for the Union. Although 
the Monitor turned back the Merri mack at the Battle of Hampton Roads 
in early March, the Confederate ironclad still lurked upriver, 
threatening to come down and complete the destruction of the wooden 
blockading squadron that denied vital supplies to the Confederacy. No 
one knew if the Monitor could repeat her earlier feat, and all officers 
concerned eagerly awaited the new ironclad. The navy was not the only 
service anticipating the Galena's arrival. General George Brinton 
McClellan, engaged in his ponderous move up the Peninsula since early 
April, urgently requested support from the navy in the form of the new 
ironclad technology. The general thought he needed an ironclad to 
reduce the Confederate strong point at Yorktown and ensure the success 
of his campaign. Although not fully cognizant of the shortcomings of 
such craft, McClellan understood their psychological impact on both his 
forces and the forces of the enemy. Indeed, would the Galena's presence 
tip the balance for the Union's control of the Peninsula? Could she give 
the Union the extra edge it needed to stamp out the rebellion? Most 
importantly, could she assist Federal forces in their effort to capture 
Richmond? 
The key question confronting the Galena was how well she would 
perform under fire. No doubt her designers and builders held high 
hopes for their creation, but she awaited the test of battle. Commodore 
Smith's constant sniping during the construction and the criticism of 
other observers loomed large in the minds of those who built her, and 
they anticipated vindication. But first she would have to convince the 
officers of the United States Navy who would operate her. They were 
critical to her success; if they would not believe in her and give her a fair 
trial, she would not have the chance to undergo the only test capable of 
silencing her critics: combat. The Galena would come of age during the 
summer of 1862. 
With the Galena in its hands, the navy rushed to finish 
construction and get the vessel into combat. Two days after her delivery, 
Commodore Smith informed Chief Engineer Joseph Farron that 
"Commodore Paulding will furnish the contractors all the facilities to 
expedite work on the Galena, " now at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. i All the 
while, General George McClellan pressured the navy for the promised 
ironclad. He informed Assistant Secretary Fox that he was "fast 
reaching a point where the success of my operations must to a certain 
extent depend upon the fact of her co-operation or the reverse. " He 
hoped that the Galena would "shorten my work here very much. "s 
Construction continued unabated for the next week as workers and 
officers attended to the final details. On April 21, the navy formally put 
the Galena into commission, with the log noting "the mechanicks still at 
work on board. " The ship's crew and the dockyard workers began 
loading the ordnance and supplies, taking on "47 tanks of powder" and 
securing the guns. s 
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The following day, the Galena left New York under tow of the 
steamer Baltic and headed for "Hampton Roads direct. "4 During the 
next few days, the crew began to familiarize themselves with the ship, 
putting the Galena through her paces and working the bugs out of her 
machinery. The journey was not uneventful. On the second day out, a 
member of the crew fell overboard. The engines were started so the ship 
could maneuver to pick him up, but the propeller fouled the tow line, 
forcing the crew to stop the engine and slip the line, freeing them from 
the Baltic. The Galena started drifting towards shore, unable to restart 
her engines, and had to drop anchor. Meanwhile, the Baltic ran 
aground. The ironclad's engines sputtered to life long enough to raise 
the anchor, but promptly broke down again. Once again an anchor was 
dropped, and the engineers sat down to figure out how to fix the 
machinery. Needless to say, the officers and crew were probably not 
impressed by their introduction to the new vessel, s 
The rest of the journey passed without incident, and on April 24, 
the Galena anchored off Fortress Monroe with a broken shaft in one of 
her engines, her guns loaded with shot in case of emergency. The crew 
could see the Monitor lying at anchor not far away, her turret pocked 
with indentations from her recent battle with the Merrimack. 
Commander Alfred Taylor, who oversaw the final construction and 
fitting out of the Galena since the middle of February, now came to the 
end of his responsibilities. Combat command of the vessel had been 
given to Commander John Rodgers, who boarded the ship at two o' clock 
that afternoon. Taylor left three hours later, his job finished. That same 
afternoon, the commander of the blockading squadron, Flag Officer 
Louis M. Goldsborough, "inspected the ship and ordered the spars cut 
away, " recognizing that the ship would have little use for them on this 
station. s 
Commander John Rodgers, son of the hero of the War of 1812 of 
the same name, had spent the first part of the war with the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron. After bringing back the Flag to 
Baltimore for engine repairs he found himself attached to General 
McClellan's Army of the Potomac "for temporary special duty. "7 He 
engaged in bridge building and troop transport for McClellan's 
Peninsula campaign. Finally, on April 22, he received orders to proceed 
to Fortress Monroe and "await arrival of Galena; your orders to 
command her are with Flag Officer Goldsborough. " Commander 
Taylor, who assumed that he would command the Galena, quietly left, 
no doubt satisfied with the generous price Rodgers paid for his cabin 
stores. Meanwhile, Rodgers took stock of his new command. s 
After spending a few days on board, he wrote his wife, Anne, 
about his assessment of the Galena: "I do not think she fully comes up 
to the idea of an iron-plated craft — but then she is very much safer 
than any ordinary vessel. "io Acting Paymaster William Frederick 
Keeler of the Monitor thought her totaly [sic] unable to cope with the 
Merrimac. "ii Goldsborough was even less impressed. Even before the 
Galena's arrival, he had been cautious about what the vessel might 
accomplish, telling Assistant Secretary Fox that "until I see the Galena 
I cannot speak with any confidence as to the part she may be able to 
play. "~s The admiral's expectations plummeted after he paid his visit. 
He dourly informed Fox that "she is, in my judgement, a most miserable 
contrivance — entirely beneath Naval criticism. "~s Four days later he 
wrote Fox that "she is a sad affair. Her projectors % builders ought to be 
ashamed of her. u4 
Word of Goldsborough's critique reached Commodore Smith in 
Washington. A "mortified" Smith sat down and wrote a private letter to 
Rodgers about the Galena, explaining that he wished the commander to 
"please tell me what you think of her. " By way of apology, he told the 
commander that "I could not attend to the vessel myself R had to trust to 
others. " Smith encouraged Rodgers to be honest in his assessment, 
noting "we do not expect perfection. " Specifically, he was "anxious" to 
have the armor scheme tested in combat, perhaps against the Yorktown 
forts currently blocking the passage of McClellan's army up the 
Peninsula and preventing the capture of Richmond. ~s 
Interservice rivalry reared its ugly head soon after the Galena 
reached Fortress Monroe. Goldsborough told Rodgers that "Genl 
McClellan seems to take it for granted you are to act under his orders, 
which may not be the case. "us Indeed, McClellan had written his wife 
that "the Galena, under Rodgers, will be here the day after tomorrow- 
in a day or two after she arrives you will hear of a blow struck that will 
surprise secesh R delight the country — I may delay it for a few days if I 
meet with any delays in my preparations. "u7 Extremely arduous 
geography hampered any advance up the Peninsula. Terrain alternated 
between dense woods and marshy areas, with few roads and no railroad 
lines to facilitate the logistics and communications requirements of an 
attacking army. The general's plan called for an advance up the 
Peninsula across its entire width, with the final goal being Richmond. 
Gunboats would cover the army's flanks on the York and James rivers. 
Control of the rivers meant that McClellan could be supplied by water 
with relative ease. The inclusion of ironclads into the naval support 
group would help keep these rivers open to Union forces. ~s 
Goldsborough opposed McClellan's plans, especially the part 
calling for a naval attack by ironclads against Yorktown and other 
targets on the James and York rivers because such operations would 
take the Monitor and the Galena upriver where neither could prevent 
the Merrimack from leaving Gosport and running amuck through the 
Union blockaders. &s McClellan relented only when Goldsborough 
pointed out that a successful foray by the Merri mack would cut the 
army's lines of communications, jeapordizing the entire campaign. 
Therefore, McClellan altered his original plan and shifted to an advance 
up the York River, leaving the ironclads to keep the Merrimack away 
from his army. He attacked Yorktown with wooden navy gunboats 
providing fire support. When the city fell on May 4, ihe general proposed 
another plan. He wanted to send an ironclad up the James River to 
interrupt the flow of Confederate supplies. Rodgers, aching for action, 
heartily agreed, but could do nothing in the face of Goldsborough's 
opposition. zo 
May 4, besides bringing the Union advance into Yorktown, 
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provided some excitement for the Galena. Assistant Secretary Fox 
visited the vessel that morning, but otherwise it seemed to be a normal 
day. Then, at quarter past one, the Merri mack rounded a distant point, 
evidently offering battle. The Galena's log reported that her crew "beat 
to Quarters and loaded small arms and got everything ready for 
immediate action but [the Merri mack] made no attempt to attack us and 
3 
at 3 4 p. m. she steamed up towards Norfolk out of site [sic]. "~& Rodgers, 
frustrated by his inability to get the Galena into combat, resorted to a 
time-honored stratagem: going over the head of his superior ofhcer. 
While dining at Fortress Monroe on May 6, Rodgers heard a 
rumor that President Lincoln had come down from Washington to check 
out the situation. Rodgers made his way to the President, where he 
presented McClellan's plan of moving up the James River. Lincoln 
initially rejected the idea on Goldsborough's advice, but changed his 
mind the next day after a tour of the Galena and a telegram from 
McClellan. Consequently, Rodgers was assigned two wooden gunboats, 
the Aroostook and the Port Royal, to assist him. Goldsborough's 
objection that three gunboats were not up to the task was cast aside in 
the general excitement over the army's success on the Peninsula as the 
navy yearned for a chance to prove itself. 
Rodgers' orders commanded him to "do all that may be within 
your power to assist the army under the command of Major-General 
McClellan, and endeavor to harass the retreat of the rebels wherever 
they can be reached. "33 In effect, this order authorized him to proceed 
as far up the James River as possible, striking beyond Union lines to 
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create confusion in the Confederate rear. The three gunboats departed 
shortly after 6 o' clock on the morning of May 8. By 8:30, they reached an 
enemy battery of eleven guns at Day's Point, which the Galena promptly 
put out of commission and set on fire after four passes in front of it. Two 
rebel gunboats, the Jamestown and the Patrick Henry, were spotted, but 
they got up steam and wisely retreated up the river ahead of the more 
powerful Federal force. The three Federal gunboats encountered a 
second rebel battery at Harden's Bluff of approximately twelve guns 
around one o' clock the same afternoon. This time it took seven passes 
before the battery was reduced, with the exception of one stubborn gun. 
Rodgers attacked the second battery by himself, ordering the Aroostook 
and the Port Royal to lie out of range for most of the attack, and then to 
run by the battery after several of its guns had been silenced. s4 
Two batteries taken care of, the gunboats proceeded up the river, 
where the Galena ran aground on a sandbar just off Hog's Island. 
Because the injection water for her boilers was taken in near the keel, 
the Galena could not use her own engines; the pipes were rapidly 
dogged with sand and river debris. She remained stuck on the sandbar 
for thirty-six hours until the Aroostook and the Port Royal could haul 
her off. Once again, the gunboats proceeded up the river, until they 
came to another bar which was obviously too shallow for the Galena to 
attempt passage. Therefore, Rodgers withdrew, requesting additional 
gunboats to provide fire support while the Galena attempted to cross the 
shoal. He was also low on ammunition, having expended forty shells on 
the first battery and 123 shells on the second. 
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In these actions, the Galena aptly demonstrated her worth as a 
floating battery. Her Dahlgren smoothbores and Parrott rifles proved a 
deadly combination when unleashed on the Confederate shore batteries. 
However, the two engagements had not fully tested her capabilities as an 
ironclad. The accurate fire of the Galena's crew "disconcerted the aim 
of the Rebel artillerists" so much that Rodgers was able to report to 
Goldsborough that "our boats escaped a shot. " However, this was not 
the case. The Galena's log records two hits, one on the Aroostook, and 
one on the Galena herself, "on our Port Quarter doing very little injury, " 
For whatever reason, Rodgers chose not to report these hits. 
Regardless, the batteries were not able to bring any significant firepower 
to bear on the ironclad, delaying her true trial by fire. zs 
The thrust up the James River had a more lasting effect which 
Rodgers and his superiors were not aware of as the three gunboats 
retired to Jamestown Island for resupply. The Confederates recognized 
that their existing defenses would not impede the Galena's passage up 
the river, leaving Richmond open to attack. Therefore, they did 
whatever they could in the short time left to them to prepare for the 
ironclad's expected advance. The existing defenses at Drewry's Bluff 
were manned by an artillery company of local soldiers commanded by 
Captain Augustus H. Drewry, on whose land the batteries stood. 
Commander J. R. Tucker of the Confederate Navy recommended 
strengthening these batteries and sinking obstructions in the river at the 
same point, it "being the only efficient mode of defending Richmond. " 
Lieutenant J. N. Barney agreed in a dispatch to "the commanding 
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officer or engineer in charge at Drewry's Bluff. " He suggested "the 
necessity of completing your arrangements for blockading the river as 
soon as possible, leaving an opening for the passage of vessels. "2 
Rodgers' call for reinforcements brought greater results than he 
could ever have hoped for. Confederate forces evacuated Norfolk on May 
10, leaving the Merrimack without a base. The vessel's commander, 
Josiah Tatnall, attempted to take her up the James to Richmond, but her 
draft was too deep and the Confederates beached and burned her on May 
11. 2 This freed the Monitor, which Goldsborough had been holding 
back to counter the Merrimack, for service with Rodgers. McClellan 
was ecstatic. He quickly telegraphed Secretary of War Stanton and 
"most earnestly [urged] that our gun boats & the iron clad boats be sent 
as far as possible up the James River without delay. " Such a move 
would "enable me to make our movements [against Richmond] much 
more decisive. "so That same day, Welles ordered Goldsborough to "push 
all the boats up the James River, even to Richmond. "» Accordingly, the 
Monitor was sent to join the Union squadron, accompanied by the 
steamer Naugatuck. 
Destruction of the Merri mack did not take her complement of 
sailors out of action; Confederate leadership quickly found a task for the 
trained gun crews of the defunct ironclad. "The officers and crew of the 
Virginia (Merri mack], except the engineer officers" were ordered to 
1 proceed to a point 1 2 miles below Drewry's Bluff to establish a battery 
there. However, upon reconsideration, they were told to report to the 
positions already prepared and were employed in strengthening them in 
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anticipation of the Galena's approach. ss For two days Drewry's 
company and the sailors struggled to mount ordnance stripped from 
Confederate gunboats, working without shelter, exposed to steady rain 
and fighting off hunger because of a lack of rations. Their efforts 
resulted in the emplacement of five more cannon, some of which proved 
critical in the coming battle. s4 
Although the army had overall command of the defenses to the 
approaches to Richmond, the sailors were placed in charge of Drewry's 
BlufF. Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory informed the new 
commander of the naval contingent, Captain Sydney Smith Lee, that 
"the naval force is expected to fight all the batteries, complete the 
obstructions, and mount additional guns where you may deem them 
necessary. " Lee was ordered to "defend the river to the last extremity. "ss 
If the Union naval vessels reached Drewry's BlufF, they would find a 
well trained enemy capable of using all means at their disposal to defend 
the passage to Richmond. 
The Monitor and the Naugatuck reached Jamestown Island and 
the Galena on May 12 and prepared to advance further up the James 
River. One Confederate battery remained on the river below the naval 
vessels. The Monitor had attempted to silence it during its passage up 
the river, but could not elevate her guns at a close enough range to fire 
efFectively. Therefore, Rodgers recommended that "a small landing 
party of marines and sailors" be sent to take the battery, opening the 
James River and allowing the naval vessels to be readily resupplied. ss 
Goldsborough promptly took action, dispatching two gunboats whose 
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ordnance could reach the troublesome battery, along with a supply 
vessel. s~ However, the incident portended things to come. The 
Monitor's inability to elevate her guns would prove disastrous for the 
Galena in the coming days. 
The disparate little squadron weighed anchor and proceeded up 
the James River on May 13, expecting to find trouble at Drewry's Bluff, 
also known as Ward's Hill. Escaped slaves had warned the navy of 
Confederate preparations, although it was difficult to assess the 
strength of the position based on their reports. The gunboats cautiously 
steamed up the river, occasionally taking sniper fire from the wooded 
banks. The further up the river they went, the narrower the banks 
became, increasing the danger of injury to the ship's crews. The 
captains of the gunboats became even more cautious on the morning of 
May 14. They expected to fight the batteries, all that stood between them 
and Richmond, later that day. Meanwhile, "all suspicious looking 
clumps of tree & bushes along the shore" which might conceal 
sharpshooters were "probed" by canister from the gunboats. The 
Galena, which had the deepest draft and therefore led the procession, 
ran aground after steaming only a few miles. The ships had to wait for 
the ebb tide to get her oK By the time she was freed, it was too late to 
proceed any further, so the "expectation of an exchange of compliments 
with the batteries on Ward's hill" was delayed for yet another day. 
The night passed quietly, marred only by a light rain. The 
Galena's crew was roused at 4:00 a. m. and began to prepare the ship for 
combat. One hour later, the captains of the Monitor, Port Royal, 
Aroostook, and Naugatuck reported to Commander Rodgers for final 
instructions. Once again, the Galena would take the lead. The 
squadron weighed anchor at 6:00 a. m. and proceeded up the river. The 
previous day's observations hinted at what they might find. Assistant 
Paymaster Keeler recorded that "the river has been covered all the 
afternoon with Sawdust, chips, logs of wood, lumber, tops of piles, 
charred fragments of steam & Sailing vessels, indicating that the rebels 
were busy filling the river with obstructions. " Sure enough, the 
Confederates had been building an obstruction in depth, consisting of at 
least two and probably three layers of sunken ships, rocks and various 
debris, with a narrow channel to permit passage of friendly vessels. 
However, they had been unable to finish their work before the Fed@als 
arrived, forcing them to sink several canalboats filled with stone and two 
steamers alongside pilings already in place. As a final measure, the 
commander of the Jamestown scuttled his vessel, blocking the 
channel. ss 
Rebel sharpshooters along the banks made it extremely 
hazardous for any man to show himself on the journey upriver; a 
bluejacket taking soundings on the Galena was mortally wounded. As a 
precaution, Rodgers ordered his crew to stand to quarters at 7:00 a. m. 
One half hour later, the Confederate batteries came into view off the port 
bow. The Galena, still at the head of the column, moved to the attack, 
along with the Monitor and the Naugatuck, whose protection consisted 
of twenty inches of white cedar and the ability to flood ballast tanks, 
taking her hull below the surface of the water. The remaining two 
gunboats were ordered to the protection of a sheltered bank. By 7:45, the 
Galena reached a position six hundred yards below the Confederate 
batteries on Drewry's Bluff, where she dropped anchor. The shore 
batteries fired first. Two shots hit the port bow, "going quite through 
and slightly wounding two men, " an inauspicious beginning for the 
experimental ironclad. 4o 
The immediate problem was to bring the Galena's ordnance to 
bear. Using a spring mechanism to pull the vessel around on her 
anchor cable, the crew presented her broadside to the Confederate 
gunners and prepared to deliver the lethal load. Rodgers elected to use 
shells against the enemy positions; solid shot would have little effect on 
earthworks. The attack would be made all the more difficult by the 
presence of a number of rifle pits dug along the shore of the river. 
Confederate sharpshooters made short work of any man foolish enough 
to expose himself. They also fired into the ports of the attacking vessels 
when possible, making life miserable for the crews servicing the guns. 
To make matters worse, it was a warm, muggy day, and the sailors, 
now forcibly encased in their iron homes, would get no relief. 4i 
The three gunboats commenced firing, but only the Galena had a 
significant efFect early in the engagement. Her broadsides raked the 
shoreline and bluff, often driving the enemy gunners from their posts 
and disrupting counterfire. The Naugatuek, armed with a 100-pounder 
Parrott rifle and several howitzers, was efFectively taken out of the action 
by the bursting of the Parrott rifle early in the engagement. Thereafter, 
she could only use her howitzers against the sharpshooters on shore. 
The Monitor, which stood below the Galena, was too far away from the 
Confederate batteries to accurately disrupt their fire. Lieutenant 
William N. Jeffers, commanding Ericsson's ironclad, noticed that the 
bulk of the enemy fire was aimed at the Galena. Therefore, at 9:00, he 
passed above the Galena in an attempt to bring the Monitor's massive 
11-inch Dahlgrens to bear. Unfortunately, the vessel's design did not 
permit her guns to be elevated enough to fire on the Confederate 
batteries, so Jeffers dropped back down to a point where he was in line 
with the Galena and continued to fire from there. 42 
Notwithstanding the casualties from the sharpshooters, the battle 
had gone well for the Union up to this point. The Galena had "nearly 
silenced the battery when we found our shells all expended. "4s Rodgers 
was forced to switch to less effective solid shot, and the course of the 
battle dramatically changed. The Confederate gunners, able to stay in 
their works and man their cannon, deftly concentrated fire on the 
Galena. For the first time, she found herself in a situation to test the 
capabilities of her armor. Rodgers noted she "was fully tried, oblique 
shot, direct shot, deck shot. "44 This hail of fire soon became a 
nightmare. 
The ship's log noted that "the battery soon opened upon us with 
terrible efiect — — every shot taking effect going through the iron armor. " 
Tragically, the ship's armor was weak enough to allow Confederate shot 
to pierce it and enter the interior. Even the shot that did not physically 
enter the interior had a destructive effect. A number of them hit the 
armor and lodged in the hull. However, they did enough damage to the 
armor to send splinters of wood and iron flying through the gun deck, 
causing numerous casualties. The plunging fire of the Confederate 
batteries also caused a great deal of damage to the weakly armored deck, 
creating a similar effect as men died both from enemy shot and 
fragments of the Galena's own iron. 4s 
Then, at 11:05, tragedy struck. A Confederate shell either pierced 
the Galena's armor or came in through one of the gun ports. It 
exploded, setting off a cartridge next to one of the guns. Three men were 
instantly killed, several wounded, and the ship filled with smoke. 
Acting Paymaster Keeler described the scene from the Monitor: 
Suddenly volumes of smoke were seen issuing from the Galena's 
ports k hatches & the cry went through us that she was on fire, or 
a shot had penetrated her boiler — — her men poured out of her 
open ports on the side opposite the batteries, clinging to the 
anchor, to loose ropes, and dropping into the boats. We at once 
raised our anchor to go to her assistance but found she did not 
need it. 47 
The Galena required no aid because Rodgers decided to withdraw from 
the engagement. Rodgers justified his retreat for the extremely 
practical reason that he was dangerously low on ammunition. The 
battle nearly exhausted his store of solid shot. He had six shells left for 
his Parrott rifles and no shells for the 9-inch Dahlgrens. The battered 
squadron silently slipped down the James River to a safe anchorage off 
Kingsland Creek. The damaged but triumphant Confederate batteries 
gave three rousing cheers to the battered vessels, confident that 
Richmond remained secure from Federal assault. The works at 
Drewry's Bluff, now named Fort Darling, stayed in place until the end of 
the war. No Union vessel ever got past them to threaten the Confederate 
capital. 4s 
The following days were filled with the writing up of official 
reports and private letters home. Keeler went on board the Galena soon 
after the battle and painted a vivid picture of the scene in a graphic letter 
to his wife: 
Here was a body with the head, one arm & part of the breast tom 
off by a bursting shell — — another with the top of his head taken 
off the brains still steaming on the deck, partly across him lay one 
with both legs taken off at the hips & at a little distance was 
another completely disemboweled. The sides & ceiling overhead, 
the ropes & guns were spattered with blood & brains & lumps of 
flesh while the decks were covered with large pools of half 
coagulated blood & strewn with portions of skulls, fragments of 
shells, arms, legs, hands, pieces of flesh & iron, splinters of wood 
& broken weapons were mixed in one confused horrible mass. 4s 
The scene described by Keeler, terrible though it was, was seen after the 
Galena's crew had made some effort to clean up the ship. Until called 
into action to replace an injured loader, one marine corporal had been 
sweeping the debris off the deck so the ship's crew could service their 
guns. Efforts to clean up probably continued after withdrawal from 
battle, before Keeler came on board. so 
The Monitor's paymaster was not the only person deeply affected 
by the Galena's experience. Commander Rodgers also wrote his wife 
the day after the battle. The opening of his letter, "Dear Anne — I have 
seen the elephant in the fighting line, " gave way to description of the 
rampant destruction he had so recently witnessed. He had several 
brushes with death that morning. In one case, an officer stopped him to 
ask a question. Halting momentarily, Rodgers moved on. A shell 
exploded a couple of feet in front of him, at the point where he would 
have been had he kept walking. In another instance, he was next to the 
gun crew that lost three of its members. The shell that devastated the 
gun deck of his ship almost did in the commander himself. Luckily, he 
only received a scratch on the face in the resulting explosion. He 
described the physical damage to the ship in some detail, but aptly 
synopsized the day's encounter by noting "the rebels demonstrated most 
fully that she is penetrable — — they killed 13 men and wounded some 11 
— — the doctor had more than he could attend to — — what with 
amputations and bandages. " It had not been an easy day for this naval 
veteran. s& 
His personal letter written, Rodgers sat down to the grim task of 
writing his official report, collecting the reports of subordinates, and 
gathering them together for delivery to his superiors. In the personal 
report, Rodgers wryly observed that "we demonstrated that she is not 
shot proof. " After briefly describing the damage, he advised that the 
Galena be repaired at Washington before again going to sea. He 
suggested repairs in Washington "since so many people there have an 
interest in iron plating, and she so well shows the effect of various shot. " 
Whether or not he intended. this last statement to be facetious is not 
known, but the Navy Department could not have missed the irony. The 
ironclad which some had condemned and others had placed great hopes 
in would come back from her first real encounter with combat bearing 
every conceivable type of damage she could possibly sustain. z 
Rodgers' executive officer, Lieutenant L. Howard Newman, was 
responsible for assessing the Galena's damage. He submitted three 
reports describing, in detail, the carnage wrought by the Confederate 
batteries. Newman counted forty-three hits on the Galena. Some of 
them glanced off, either because their velocity was too low or because 
they hit the vessel at a bad angle. If for the latter reason, then the severe 
tumble home design of the ship's hull was successful. However, the 
number of penetrating hits far outnumbered those that glanced off. 
Thirty-seven of the forty-three shots counted by Newman did some 
tangible damage to the vessel. Even some of the glancing shots broke the 
armor before bounding off. A brief list assessing the injury inflicted by 
each enemy shot was almost two pages long when printed up. No area 
of the ship escaped notice. Newman catalogued broken armor, gaping 
holes in the deck, broken timbers, shattered planking, damaged 
bulkheads, and a number of shots still lodged in the hull. In short, the 
Galena suffered massive damage. All parts of the vessel were affected; 
she had not been forced to withdraw because of one or two lucky hits. ss 
The official report of the Monitor serves as a useful counterpoint to 
Newman's damage report. Jeffers' account of the Monitor's role in the 
attack on Drewry's Bluff mentions that the ironclad was hit three times 
by Confederate cannon. One shot hit "squarely on the turret, " doing no 
damage, while the other two hit "the side armor forward of the pilot 
house; neither caused any damage beyond bending the plates. " 
Although the rebel gunners concentrated on the Galena, a fact 
acknowledged by Jeffers, and the Monitor was just below the Galena, the 
lack of damage is interesting for two reasons. First, the shots that did 
strike the Monitor only dented the plates and bounded off. No shots 
penetrated her armor or lodged in her hull, as was the case with the 
Galena. Consequently, her crew suffered no casualties. Second, the 
Monitor's basic design may have hampered Confederate aim. Her 
turret and extremely low freeboard minimized the target the enemy had 
to shoot at, whereas the Galena, built on more traditional lines, offered a 
much broader silhouette. She had to present her broadside to deliver her 
ordnance. All things considered, on the basis of the Battle of Hampton 
Roads and the Battle of Drewry's Bluff, the Monitor appeared to be the 
better ship. s4 
Reaction to the repulse at Drewry's Bluff varied. Union 
commanders recognized that the Confederate obstructions could not 
have been passed by the Union flotilla, but not everyone understood that 
the battle had been the decisive test of the Galena's design. General 
George McClellan, "after a careful consideration of the meager 
accounts" received by his headquarters, concluded that "their repulse 
will prove to be due to the fact that they were subjected to a close 
musketry fire they could not reply to. "ss McClellan had good reason for 
projecting optimism. Still mired down in his creeping advance up the 
Peninsula, he needed gunboats to protect his flanks, secure his 
communications, and harass the Confederate rear. Thus, he remained 
under the spell of the ironclad panacea, failing to recognize that all 
ironclads were not alike. 
The psychological effect of these new weapons had not yet worn off 
either in the North or the South. Like many of his contemporaries, 
McClellan overlooked the technological limitations of the ironclads and 
placed great hope in their ability to perform as advertised. Northern 
poets, journalists, and songwriters extolled the virtues and capabilities 
of the new technology, creating a myth of their invincibility that endured 
long after the war was over. Southerners, especially those in the West 
where ironclads played a key role in opening the Mississippi River to 
Union domination, also bought into the myth. Even though several 
ironclads would be sunk or heavily damaged during the war, the impact 
of the new technology was so great that it altered perceptions of reality in 
contemporary minds. By the end of the war, many observers had 
adopted a more pragmatic view of the iron behemoths, but their 
estimations often exceeded actual performance. 
The New York Times made a point of comparing the damage 
sustained by each ship at Drury's Bluff. Its report of the action against 
Fort Darling noted: 
Of twenty-eight shots that struck the Galena, eighteen penetrated 
her armor. Not one of those striking the Monitor, however, did 
her any damage whatever, all glancing off. It seems the armor of 
the Galena was not designed to resist heavy shot of the description 
fired at her from the fort, at so great an angle of elevation. Thus is 
the fact that her armor proved inefficient on this occasion 
accounted for. 
The next day, the Times reprinted the opinion of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer. In that paper's opinion, "the Galena suffered severely, " while 
"the Monitor. . . maintained her superior strength and 
invulnerability. " s These assessments differed markedly from the 
Times' earlier optimism of May 19. Having received early reports of the 
battle, an article opined "that any armament [Fort Darling] mounted 
was able to 'repel, ' sink or seriously damage our iron-clad gunboats, we 
shall be very slow to believe. " Like many of the public, the Times 
expected "that the delay will be no longer than to allow the removal of the 
obstructions, when our iron-clad gunboats will move on to the rebel 
capital" and force its surrender. ss 
Reaction in naval circles was not nearly as optimistic, but it bowed 
to circumstances. Rodgers submitted a report on May 20 informing his 
1 immediate superior that the Galena was leaking badly, taking on 2 & 
inches of water an hour. He also noted that "her port side is much 
shattered by cannon shot. " This report made its way to Flag Officer 
Goldsborough, who, while recognizing that the vessel needed repair, 
ordered her to remain on station because of circumstances. He thought 
it "really terrible if she should have to leave the James River at this 
time. " Realistically, he could not allow the Galena to leave and 
considered her leak "comparatively, of no serious moment. " 
McClellan's push up the Peninsula demanded every available resource, 
and Goldsborough was not about to let one of his two ironclads go as long 
as it remained functional. so 
Nobody recognized this more than Rodgers. In a letter to 
Goldsborough, he hoped the admiral would "not send the Galena away 
from James River while there is any chance of her being of more service 
than an ordinary gunboat. " Despite the damage suffered at the hands of 
the Confederate batteries, Rodgers was still of the opinion that "the shots 
we received at our water line, and which we are still able to receive, 
would sink a wooden vessel. " Still, he knew that his ship had taken a 
beating, and recommended that she not "be sent to sea in her present 
condition. "si 
The navy was planning an attack against Wilmington, North 
Carolina, and Secretary Welles had been pushing Goldsborough to 
attach the Monitor and the Galena to the expedition. Goldsborough did 
not think the Galena was up to the task, and appointed a board of officers 
to examine her and report her condition, the final report to be forwarded 
to Welles. The board "held a strict and careful survey upon the condition 
of this vessel, " and came to the same conclusions expressed earlier by 
Rodgers. Not only had the armor been badly damaged, but the 
structural integrity of the frame was in doubt and they did not think she 
should be exposed to the rigors of an ocean passage. They recommended 
"that the Galena be sent, so soon as the pressing exigencies of service 
will admit, to some port inside the cape for thorough examination and 
repairs. " Upon receipt of the board's report, which included a detailed 
list of the vessel's injuries, Welles admitted that "she certainly cannot be 
repaired in time to be of service" and dropped the matter of her inclusion 
in the expedition to Wilmington. However, she was to remain on station 
until she could be augmented by ironclads then building. The 
psychological impact of her presence still outweighed her actual 
capabilities. s2 
While the officers at the scene assessed the Galena's combat 
readiness, Commodore Joseph Smith haggled with C. S. Bushnell gt: 
Company over the final payment for the vessel. Initially, he decided to 
suspend all payments and wait for "the report of the test of the Galena, " 
after which "the Bureau will present its claim for damage in not 
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complying with your contract. " Smith sent a note to Rodgers asking 
him to conduct a series of trials "for twelve consecutive hours in smooth 
water" to determine whether or not the terms of the contract had been 
met. These conditions implied an ocean test, for which the Galena was 
clearly not suited at this time. Smith did not know the extent of the 
damage at the time of his request, but when he found out he assured her 
builder that he was "mortified" at the outcome of the duel with the 
batteries. Although unsure about what course of action he would 
pursue in light of her combat failure, he was sure that the government 
would find it necessary to withhold any further payments. 
Unfortunately, Smith found himself in a race with time. The 
agreement with Bushnell & Company stipulated that the government 
had ninety days from time of delivery to conduct the trials set out in the 
contract: 
That she shall when loaded for sea, make a speed under steam of 
~wl ~kn, ~rg~mil y, 11~rh 11r, in smooth water, and carry 
~ in the bunker n n m i t ha . That 
her frost sills amidships shall float seven feet above the water 
when the vessel is down to her load water-line, and that she shall 
have stability to carry said armament, armor, boats, provisions, 
stores and outfits of all kinds with 2500 gallons of water in tanks, 
and a crew of 130 persons, with all sails set, safely at sea as a 
cruising vessel. s4 
The Galena had been delivered to the government on April 15. Ninety 
days gave the navy until the middle of July to conduct its trials and 
determine whether or not the vessel was deficient. Smith was confident 
that the report "will no doubt be received, and acted upon before the 
ninety days provided for the trial of the vessel expires. " Still, he wrote 
Goldsborough and asked him to push along the trials. He gave up on the 
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idea of an ocean test, asking instead that she conduct a day's run down 
the James River. ss 
For a variety of reasons, Smith's request could not be 
accommodated by the officers in the combat zone. Rumors of another 
Confederate ironclad at Richmond had reached the Union navy on the 
James River, and Commodore Charles Wilkes, the commander of the 
James River Flotilla, was not about to let the Galena go. Even though 
she was damaged, she was still useful, if only for her ordnance. He 
would have allowed her to make a run down the river, but that was 
impossible "owing to shoal water and narrow passages. " On July 16, he 
promised to send her down to the bay "as soon as circumstances permit" 
for trials, but by this time it was too late. The deadline had passed, and 
it was Smith, ironically, who fell victim to the terms of the contract. 
Reluctantly, he informed Bushnell that "the time having expired within 
which tests of her performance should have been made, the Secretary of 
the Navy will not, under all the circumstances, enforce a claim for 
damage for non-compliance of contract in regard to time of completion. " 
Given the tenor of his letters to Bushnell in the preceding eight months, 
this must have been particularly painful to write. s 
Interest in the Galena's failure extended beyond official circles. 
One of the most prolific writers on technical affairs of the day, 
Alexander Lyman Holley, addressed the Galena's deficiencies in a 
series of articles and a book on the status of the steel industry, ordnance, 
armor, and ironclads. Holley set out the basic premise of the failure of 
the vessel's armor in two articles in 1863. He recognized that armor 
derived much of its strength from the whole, not just the individual 
plates or bars. The ship's frame and the method by which the individual 
plates were joined together were as important as the structure of the 
plates themselves, if not more so. He classified the Galena's armor as 
"very defective, as each bar, deriving little strength from those adjacent, 
offers only the resistance of its own small section. " In his opinion, 
navies had to make a choice between less expensive armor, like the 
Galena's, or armor that would withstand the battering blows of enemy 
ordnance in close quarters. 
Holley expounded on the effects of shot against the Galena's 
armor in an important work published in 1865. Moving beyond his 
earlier work describing why the armor itself was deficient, he addressed 
what happened to the armor once it was hit. Armored ships were 
especially dangerous to their own crews. 
The armor, it is true, is only punched by a swift shot; but the part 
punched out is generally broken to pieces, and the shot is broken 
to pieces, and the backing and skin are tom to splinters, every one 
of which is a missile of sufficient power to put men, if not 
machinery, hors de combat. This was actually the case in the 
thinly-clad Galena, when pierced by the fire of Fort Darling, on 
the James River, The debris of the armor spread on all sides of 
the line of the shot, in the form of a cone. Although the shot-hole 
may be little larger than the projectile, in the front of the plate, it 
is invariably much larger in the rear. ss 
It should be noted that Holley was in a perfect position to make 
judgements about the Galena's armor. From 1863 to 1866 he was the 
chief engineer at the Rensselaer and Albany Iron Works, owned by John 
Griswold and John Winslow, the designers of the armor. Their 
expertise, opinions, and plans were readily available as Holley put 
together his massive work. 
The Galena spent the remainder of 1862 and early 1863 in the 
James River Flotilla and North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. The 
navy made what repairs it could, but she was never in the same 
condition as before the Battle of Drewry's Bluff. Still commanded by 
John Rodgers, she spent the summer of 1862 supporting McClellan's 
laborious movement up and down the Peninsula, providing fire support, 
covering troop movements, and harassing the enemy whenever possible. 
Her log recorded several brushes with small rebel detachments, 
especially cavalry sent to disrupt McClellan's communications. ORen 
her crew did not even see the enemy, as was the case on June 26, when 
they were ordered up the Appamattox River to bombard a wooded area 
suspected of harboring a rebel troop concentration. ss 
As the Army of the Potomac retreated down the Peninsula during 
the final days of June and the beginning of July, the gunboats became 
increasingly important. On June 30, Rodgers reported much of the 
army had found refuge on the banks of the James River under the 
protection of the navy's guns, including the Galena. One day later he 
reported to Goldsborough that "we need in this vicinity all the gunboats 
we can get as soon as possible. Yesterday, I hear, we did good service in 
shelling the rebel army. " McClellan confirmed this assessment that 
same day in a dispatch to Goldsborough requesting "that every gunboat 
or other armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at 
once to this vicinity, and placed under the orders of Commander 
Rodgers, for the purpose of covering the camps and communications of 
this army. " The navy quickly responded to McClellan's plea, and by 
July 4, Goldsborough could report seventeen gunboats "at the scene of 
action. "7o 
The presence of the Union gunboats had a definite impact on the 
actions of the Confederate leaders. General Robert E. Lee, who 
commanded the rebel thrust pushing McClellan down the Peninsula, 
recognized the impact of the gunboats. He explained the situation to 
Jefferson Davis on July 4: 
The enemy's batteries occupy the ridge along which the Charles 
City road runs, north of the creek, and his gunboats lying below 
the mouth of the creek sweep the ground in front of his batteries. 
Above his encampments which lie on the river, his gunboats also 
extend, where the ground is more favorable to be searched by their 
cannon. As far as I can now see, there is no way to attack him to 
advantage, nor do I wish to expose the men to the destructive 
missiles of his gunboats. . . I fear he is too secure under cover of 
his boats to be driven from his position. 7& 
Davis accepted Lee's explanation, noting that while "it is a hard 
necessity to be compelled to allow him time to recover from his 
discomfiture and to receive re-enforcements. . . I fully concur with you 
as to the impropriety of exposing our brave and battle-thinned troops to 
the fire of the gunboats. "72 McClellan would hold these positions until 
the end of August, when the bulk of his army withdrew to Washington. 
The gunboats, led by the Galena, would continue to support the army 
until the final withdrawal as they had before the retreat. 
Events briefly thrust the Galena into the limelight when 
McClellan used her as his headquarters during the Battle of Malvern 
Hill, the final engagement in the Seven Days Campaign, while ignoring 
the real fighting at Glendale. A widely circulated (but erroneousl 
Currier and Ives cartoon during the presidential campaign of 1864 
pictured McClellan in a saddle on the spanker boom of the Galena 
watching his troops from the safety of the gunboat. Other than that, she 
performed admirable service, but was no more important to the Union 
efforts than any other gunboat. Of course, this assessment does not take 
her psychological impact into account, which is impossible to judge. 
The Confederates could not accurately assess her capabilities, which 
made her presence important and justified the navy's reluctance to send 
her to a proper navy yard for repairs. In the end, this may have been the 
Galena's most significant contribution. She held the line while the 
Union built more Monitor-style ironclads, not due for delivery until the 
fall of 1862. 7s 
The confidence of a ship's commander provides the best gauge of 
her capabilities. Commander Rodgers' actions during the fall of 1862 
demonstrate that he knew he had gotten all possible value out of this 
experimental ironclad. Being aware of the new ironclads building in 
Northern shipyards, Rodgers knew that his future lay with the next 
generation of ironclad warships. He wrote to Secretary of the Navy 
Welles in October asking for command of one of the new vessels. Welles 
at first declined, because "in view of the responsibilities of your present 
position, the Department does not feel justified in granting your 
request. " However, the Secretary promised "that a suitable command 
will be conferred upon you when the exigencies of the service will admit 
of it. " Rodgers chafed, not quite sure what was so important about "the 
responsibilities of [his] present position, " but he eventually got his 
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request and was assigned to command of the new monitor Weehawken, 
with which he forced the Confederate ram Atlanta to surrender outside 
of Charleston the following summer. 74 
After duty with the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the 
Galena was ordered to Philadelphia for repairs. Having seen that her 
armor was not "shotproof, " and probably unwilling to get replacement 
armor rolled for her, the Navy Department authorized the removal of 
her armor on May 13, 1863 and refitted her as a wooden gunboat. She 
was recommissioned on February 15, 1864 and sent to join the West Gulf 
Blockading Squadron. On August 5, she participated in the Battle of 
Mobile Bay, lashed to the steam sloop Oneida for protection from the fire 
of shore batteries. After another refit from November 23, 1864 to March 
29, 1865, she rejoined the fleet and served as a blockader until the fall of 
the Confederacy in April. She was decommissioned on June 17, 1865, 
condemned by survey in 1870, and broken up at the Norfolk Navy Yard in 
1872. 7s 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Galena's checkered career consistently points to failure. Her 
construction was marred by delays and incessant bickering between her 
contractors and the Federal government. Once taken into combat, she 
performed below expectations when challenged by a well-prepared and 
determined foe. As an ironclad warship, she failed to meet the 
standards of effectiveness that contemporary warships set. Unlike the 
Monitor, she proved incapable of resisting the concentrated fire of shore 
batteries, for which she had not been designed but which appeared to be 
increasingly important as the character of the operations in the war 
became manifest. On the other hand, for a more comprehensive 
understanding of her significance to Civil War and American naval 
history, the Galena needs to be placed in the context of her time. 
Although a failure, she was an important participant in the hit or miss 
process of determining American ironclad design in the early days of 
the war. The fact that no more ironclad gunboats were built on her 
design means that the navy learned from the inadequacies of her 
design. Thus, she is more notable as a valuable test case than as a 
combatant. 
Early initiative in ironclad construction rested not with the United 
States, but with England and France. While the Americans had 
undertaken a few scattered tests and built one or two experimental ships 
before the Civil War, the British and French had devoted much study to 
the problems and theory of ironclad construction. Clearly, they led the 
field. The pride of the United States Navy on the eve of the Civil War was 
the wooden steam ships of war built during the previous decade. The 
exigencies of war changed conventional American thinking. The 
Confederacy, hoping to dramatically alter the existing balance of power 
and break the blockade, pushed ahead with the conversion of the hull of 
the Merri mack into an ironclad ram. Rumors of the rebel efforts 
galvanized a skeptical United States Navy Department into action. 
The call for ironclads and the subsequent winnowing process 
produced three disparate designs. This was not the result of stupidity or 
confusion. The intent of the naval board that recommended the three 
designs was to build three experimental vessels the navy could assess 
and use to determine the direction of future construction. Simply put, 
no one knew what would work and what would fail. As a result, the 
board cast a wide net, hoping to discover a successful design that would 
adequately serve the Union's needs in the looming conflict. 
Each design offered its own advantages and disadvantages. The 
Galena was relatively cheap to build, could carry a heavy broadside, and 
was especially suited for riverine operations. She offered a new hull 
design which, if successful, would significantly reduce damage from 
enemy ordnance. Her armor scheme was also radically different from 
either of her competitors, or European vessels for that matter. Because 
she was a gunboat, the Galena could not carry the armor load of the 
bigger ocean-going cruisers like the Gloire, Warrior, or peur Ironsi des. 
Her plate and rail armor was designed to overcome this obstacle while 
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still providing superior protection and could be manufactured more 
1 
cheaply than the 4 & inch plates used on larger vessels. Necessity forced 
the search for alternative armor schemes; rolling mills in the United 
States were as yet incapable of producing those thick plates. Until 
industry adapted, as it did in the case of the New Ironsides, American 
inventors would try to circumvent convention with technical expertise. 
They succeeded with the Monitor, but failed with the Galena. 
It was one thing to authorize the three ironclads, but quite 
another to actually build them. The construction of the Galena provides 
an excellent example of the confusion and myriad delays encountered by 
the government and its contractors as they struggled to transform hopes 
into reality. Not surprisingly, the parts of the ship that relied on 
traditional construction techniques were quickly and efficiently built. 
However, the incorporation of new technologies into the process created 
bottlenecks and design problems from the start. Although there were 
some difficulties with the engines and the steering system, the armor 
proved to be the most troublesome aspect of the Galena's construction. 
First the physical design was changed and then the plan for attaching it 
to the ship's hull was altered near the end of the construction process. 
The delays point out the fallibility of the men assigned to put the 
Galena in the water. Commodore Joseph Smith, the government's 
watchdog over the construction of all three ironclads, gradually became 
disillusioned with almost everything about the Galena. Used to dealing 
with a naval bureaucracy where rank and influence carried weight, 
Smith quickly learned that recalcitrant contractors best understood the 
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power of the purse. His correspondence with C. S. Bushnell R Company 
shows a distinct evolution during the construction process. At the 
beginning, Smith projected optimism about the project. As construction 
went on and delays started to mount, he wrote cajoling letters designed 
to spur the builders on. Finally, as it became apparent that the ship 
would not be built in time to be even close to the deadline, he turned to 
financial penalties, cutting off payments to subcontractors until the 
vessel was in the hands of the government and had completed her trials. 
Ironically, Smith had to pay the final sums of the contract to Bushnell % 
Company when the government could not meet the terms of the contract 
which he had tried to enforce so rigidly. The delays and bureaucratic 
sniping were not exclusive to the Galena. Both the Monitor and the New 
Ironsides encountered similar difficulties, and while the cases differ in 
specifics, the examination of the Galena illustrates the problems 
encountered by the government as it tried to mobilize and utilize 
Northern industry for the war effort. 
Once the Galena was delivered to the navy and sent into combat, 
she proved a dismal tactical failure. Her first serious encounter with 
the enemy was also her last, at least as an ironclad. She could not 
withstand the concentrated fire of a determined opponent and became a 
death trap for several of her crew. However, no matter how poorly she 
performed in battle, she was of great strategic importance to the Union. 
Despite the extensive damage inflicted on her, she would not be taken off 
station and sent to a navy yard for repairs until almost a year after the 
Battle of Drewry's Bluff. There are several reasons for her strategic 
importance. 
First, the Galena gave Union forces in the James River a 
psychological edge. She was still an ironclad, and both the Union and 
Confederate forces knew it. Despite the punishment she had taken from 
the rebel artillerists, she was still an intimidating vessel, The 
Confederates could not be sure of her defensive capabilities, and ironclad 
'technology was still new enough so that they usually erred on the side of 
conservatism. The duels between the Merrimack and the Congress and 
Cumberland had decisively shown that ironclads were the way of the 
future. Therefore, neither side actively discounted the Galena's 
presence. She also provided a psychological boost to the Union soldiers 
she supported in the Peninsula Campaign. The popular press, 
especially in the Eastern theater, magnified the capabilities of the new 
technology to the point of distortion. The troops knew they had two of 
these ironclads (the Galena and the Monitor) to support their flanks, 
while the enemy had none, which must have been reassuring. 
In addition to her psychological effect, the Galena had a proven 
physical impact on her theater of operations. She had been designed 
and built as a gunboat and was well suited to riverine operations. Her 
armament, six 9-inch Dahlgren smoothbores and two 100-pounder 
Parrott rifles, was imposing if not extremely formidable. During May 
and June of 1862, she provided critical fire support for General 
McClellan's men as they moved up the Peninsula towards Richmond. 
Her ability to bring her battery to bear at any point on the James River 
was a vital part of McClellan's campaign strategy. She could be in 
position with her heavy guns far faster than an artillery batte~. 
McClellan, always hesitant to risk his men in battle, counted on gunboat 
support during the early summer months to inflict damage on the 
enemy. 
The Galena was more important to McClellan during the retreat 
back down the Peninsula. As flagship of the James River Flotilla, she 
covered the retreat of the army after the Seven Days. Along with other 
gunboats under Commander Rodgers' command, she created a safe 
haven for Union troops along the banks of the James River which the 
Confederates would not dare attack. These gunboats, providing covering 
fire on the army's flanks, stabilized a critical situation and allowed 
McClellan to regroup. The Galena, because of her psychological value 
as an ironclad, found herself stationed at the most critical points during 
the retreat and eventual halt. 
Finally, the Galena was strategically important as a stop-gap 
measure. Even before she had finished building, the Navy Department 
had decided to make Monitor-style ironclads the focus of its construction 
program. However, the Department faced a delay of several months 
until the first of these turreted ironclads could be delivered to the navy 
and sent to their stations. Until they reached the fleet, the Galena was 
critically important because she was one of only three ironclads (the 
Net@ Ironsides was delivered in September, 1862) in service on the 
Eastern seaboard. The navy was well aware of her limitations and tried 
to work around them whenever possible, but she was still among the 
best they had. The practical realities of the situation dominated 
whatever obvious shortcomings she demonstrated. Of course, once the 
new monitors arrived, she was sent back to a navy yard, where her 
armor was stripped and she was refitted to rejoin the fleet as a wooden 
gunboat. 
In the final analysis, the Galena was not important for any 
sterling achievements as a warship. Without a doubt she was a failure, 
and that is why historians have ignored her, concentrating on her more 
famous sisters, the Monitor and the New Ironsides. But failure does not 
translate into unimportance. The story of the construction and early 
operational history of the Galena provides a fresh perspective on the 
obstacles encountered by the Navy Department as it pondered the uses of 
new technology. The ironclad fleet which propelled the United States to 
the pinnacle of the world's navies for a short time during and 
immediately after the Civil War had an awkward and often forgotten 
beginning. The Galena, shortcomings aside, was an important part of 
that beginning. 
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APPENDIX A 
BILLS PAID TOWARDS THE STEVENS WAR STKVVIER 
First a ro riation of $250, 000: 
Date A roved 
January 5, 1845 
August 22, 1845 
February 13, 1848 
February 13, 1849 
February 13, 1849 
February 13, 1849 
February 13, 1849 
July 25, 1849 
April 6, 1853 
April 6, 1853 
March 3, 1854 
March 3, 1854 
September 20, 1854 
September 20, 1854 
October 18, 1854 
Amount 
11, 282. 99 
19, 760. 67 
2, 361. 20 
249. 56 
5, 061. 84 
6, 052. 95 
18, 694. 46 
12, 225. 37 
9, 614. 59 
12, 954. 08 
8, 258. 03 
6, 618. 97 
36, 012. 30 
38, 511. 81 
58, 876. 88 
Second a ro riation of $250, 000: 
Date A roved 
March 19, 1855 
March 19, 1855 
April 11, 1855 
May 22, 1855 
July 17, 1855 
August 30, 1855 
September 13, 1855 
December 14, 1855 
Amount 
20, 776. 79 
68, 920. 82 
12, 131. 81 
15, 448. 36 
50, 603. 43 
45, 943. 45 
32, 533. 00 
7, 106. 64 
APPENDIX B 
An act to provide for the construction of one or more armored ships and 
floating batteries, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of 
the Navy be, and is hereby authorized and directed to appoint a board of 
three skilful naval officers to investigate the plans and specifications 
that may be submitted for the construction or completing of iron or steel- 
clad steamships or steam batteries, and, on their report, should it be 
favorable, the Secretary of the Navy will cause one or more armored or 
iron and steel-clad steamships or floating steam batteries to be built; and 
there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, the sum of one million five hundred thousand 
dollars. 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That in case of a vacancy in the 
office of engineer-in-chief of the navy the appointment thereto shall be 
made from the list of chief engineers. 
APPENDIX C 
REPORT ON IRON CLAD VESSELS 
NAVY DEPARTMENT, 
Bureau of Yards and Docks September 16, 1661 
SIR: The undersigned, constituting a board appointed by your 
order of the 8th ultimo, proceeded to the duty assigned to them, in 
accordance with the first section of an act of Congress, approved 3d of 
August 1861, directing the Secretary of the Navy "to appoint a board of 
three skilful naval officers to investigate the plans and specifications 
that may be submitted for the constuction or completing of iron-clad or 
steel clad steamships or floating steam batteries to be built; and there is 
hereby apporpriated, the sum of one million five hundred thousand 
dollars. " 
Distrustful of our ability to discharge this duty, which the law 
requires should be performed by three skilful naval officers, we 
approach the subject with diffidence, having no experience and but 
scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture. 
The plans submitted are so various, and in many respects so 
entirely dissimilar, that without a more thorough knowledge of this 
mode of construction and the resisting properties of iron than we 
possess, it is very likely that some of our conclusions may prove 
erroneous. 
Application was made to the Department for a naval constructor, 
to be placed under our orders, with whom we might consult; but it 
appears that they are all so employed on important service that none 
could be assigned to this duty. 
The construction of iron clad steamships of war is now zealously 
claiming the attention of foreign naval powers. France led; England 
followed, and is now somewhat extensively engaged in the system; and 
other powers seem to emulate their example, though on a smaller scale. 
Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy 
of adopting the iron armature for ships-of-war. For coast and harbor 
defence they are undoubtedly formidable adjuncts to fortifications on 
land. As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their 
advantage and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are 
endeavoring to perfect them, we must not remain idle. 
The enormous load of iron, as so much additional weight to the 
vessel; the great breadth of beam necessary to give her stability; the short 
supply of coal she will be able to stow in bunkers; the greater power 
required to propel her; and the largely increased cost of construction, 
are objections to this class of vessels as cruisers, which we believe is 
difficult successfully to overcome. For river and harbor service we 
consider iron-clad vessels of light draught, or floating batteries thus 
shielded, as very important; and we feel at this moment the necessity of 
them on some of our rivers and inlets to enforce obedience to the laws. 
We however do not hesistate to express the opinion, notwithstanding all 
we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship or floating 
battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope with a properly 
constructed fortification of masonry. The one is fixed and immovable 
and though constructed of a material which may be shattered by shot, 
can be covered if need be, by the same or much heavier armor than a 
floating vessel can bear, whilst the other is subject to disturbances by 
winds and waves, and to the powerful effects of tides and currents. 
Armored ships or batteries may be employed advantageously to 
pass fortifications on land for ulterior objects of attack, to run a blockade, 
or to reduce temporary batteries on the shores of rivers and the 
approaches to our harbors. 
From what we know of the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of ships constructed of wood over those of iron, we are 
clearly of opinion that no iron-clad vessel of equal displacement can be 
made to obtain the same speed as one not thus encumbered, because her 
form would be better adapted to speed. Her form and dimensions, the 
unyielding nature of the shield, detract materially in a heavy sea from 
the life, bouyancy and spring which a ship built of wood possesses. 
Wooden ships may be said to be but coffins for their crews when 
brought into conflict with iron-clad vessels; but the speed of the former, 
we take for granted, being greater than that of the latter, they can 
readily choose their position and keep out of harm's way entirely. 
Recent improvements in the form and preparations of projectiles, 
and their increased capacity for destruction, have elicited a large 
amount of ingenuity and skill to devise means for resisting them in the 
construction of ships-of-war. As yet we know of nothing superior to the 
large and heavy spherical shot in its destructive effects on vessels, 
whether plated or not. 
Rifled guns have greater range, but the conical shot does not 
produce the crushing effect of spherical shot. 
1 It is assumed that 4 z - inch plates are the heaviest armor a sea- 
going vessel can safely carry. These plates should be of tough iron, and 
rolled in large, long pieces. This thickness of armor, it is believed, will 
resist all projectiles now in general use at a distance of 500 yards, 
especially if the ship's sides are angular. 
Plates hammered in large masses are less fibrous and tough 
when rolled. The question whether wooden backing, or any elastic 
substance behind the iron plating will tend to relieve at all the frame of 
the ships from the crushing effect of a heavy projectile, is not yet 
decided. Major Barnard says, "to put an elastic material behind the iron 
is to insure its destruction. " With all deference to such creditable 
authority, we may suggest that it is possible a backing of some elastic 
substance (soft wood, perhaps, is the best) might relieve the frame of the 
ship somewhat from the terrible shock of a heavy projectile, though the 
plate should not be fractured. 
With respect to a comparison between ships of iron and those of 
wood, without plating, high authorities in England differ as to which is 
the best. The tops of ships built of iron, we are told, wear out three 
bottoms; whilst the bottoms of those built of wood will outwear three tops. 
In deciding upon the relative merits of iron and wooden-framed vessels, 
for each of which we have offers, the board is of the opinion that it would 
be well to try a specimen of each, as both have distinguished advocates. 
One strong objection to iron vessels, which, so far as we know, has not 
yet been overcome, is the oxidation or rust in salt water, and their 
liability of becoming foul under water by the attachment of sea grass and 
animaleules to their bottoms. The best preventive we know of is a 
coating of pure zinc paint, which, so long as it lasts, is believed to be an 
antidote to this cause of evil. 
After these brief remarks on the subject generally, we proceed to 
notice the plans and offers referred to us for the construction of plated 
vessels and floating batteries. 
It has been suggested that the most ready mode of obtaining an 
iron-clad ship-of-war would be to contract with responsible parties in 
England for its complete construction; and we are assured that parties 
there are ready to engage in such an enterprise on terms more 
reasonable, perhaps, than such vessels could be built in this country, 
having much greater experience and facilities than we possess. Indeed, 
we are informed there are no mills and machinery in this country 
1 
capable of rolling iron 4 & inches thick, though plates might be 
hammered to that thickness in many of our workshops. As before 
observed, rolled iron is considered much the best, and the difficulty of 
rolling it increases rapidly with the thickness. It has, however, 
occurred to us that a difficulty might arise with the British government 
in case we should undertake to construct ships-of-war in that country, 
which might complicate their delivery; and, moreover, we are of the 
opinion that every people or nation who can maintain a navy should be 
capable of constructing it themselves. 
Our immediate demands seem to require, first, so far as 
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practicable, vessels invulnerable to shot, of light draught of water, to 
penetrate our shoal harbors, rivers, and bayous. We, therfore, favor the 
construction of this class of vessels before going into the more perfect 
system of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war. We are here met with 
the difficulty of encumbering small vessels with armor, which, from 
their size, there are unable to bear. We, nevertheless, recommend that 
contracts be made with responsible parties for the construction of one or 
more iron-clad vessels or batteries of as light a draught of water as 
practicable consistent with their weight of armor. Meanwhile, availing 
of the experience thus obtained, and the improvements which we believe 
are yet to be made by other naval powers in building iron-clad ships, we 
would advise the construction, in our own dock-yards, of one or more of 
these vessels upon a large and more perfect scale, when Congress shall 
see fit to authorize it. The amount now appropriated is not sufficient to 
built both classes of vessels to any great extent. 
We have made a synopsis of the propositions and specifications 
submitted, which we annex, and now proceed to state, in brief, the result 
of our decisions upon the offers presented to us. 
d. Ericsson, New York, page 19. — This plan of a floating battery is 
novel, but seems to be based upon a plan which will render the battery 
shot and shell proof. We are somewhat apprehensive that her properties 
for sea are not such as a sea-going vessel should possess. But she may 
be moved from one place to another on the coast in smooth water. We 
recommend that an experiment be made with one battery of this 
description on the terms proposed, with a guarantee and forfeiture in 
case of failure in any of the properties and points of the vessel as 
proposed. 
Price: $275, 000; length of vessel, 172 feet; breadth of beam, 41 feet; 
1 depth of hold, 11 & feet; time, 100 days; draught of water, 10 feet, 
displacement, 1, 255 tons; speed per hour, nine statute miles. 
John W. Nystrom, Philadelphia, 1216 Chestnut Stree, page 1. — 
The plan of (quadruple) guns is not known, and cannot be considered. 
The dimensions would not float the vessel without the guards, which we 
are not satisfied would repel shot. We do not recommend the plan. 
Price, about $175, 000; length of vessel, 175 feet; breadth of beam, 27 
feet; depth of hold, 13 feet; time, four months; draught of water, 10 feet; 
displacement, 875 tons; speed per hour, 12 knots. 
William Perine, New York, 2777 post office box, , presents three 
plans. The specifications and drawings are not full. The last proposal 
(No. 3, page 2) for the heavy plating is the only one we have considered, 
but there is neither drawing nor model, and the capacity of the vessel, 
we think, will not bear the armor and armament proposed. 
1 Price, $621, 000; length of vessel, 225 feet; breadth of beam, 45 
& 
1 feet; depth of hold, 15 s feet; time, 9 months; draught of water, 13 feet; 
displacement, 2, 454 tons; speed per hour, 10 knots. 
John C. Le Ferre, Boston, page 9. — Description deficient. Not 
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recommended. Sent a model, but neither price, time, nor dimensions 
stated. 
E. S. Renwick, New York, 335 Broadway, presents drawings, 
specification, and model of an iron-clad vessel of large capacity and 
powerful engines, with great speed, capable of carrying a heavy battery, 
and stated to be shotproof and a good sea-boat. The form and manner of 
construction and proportions of this vessel are novel, and will attract the 
attention of scientific and practical men. She is of very light draught of 
water, and on the question of whethei she will prove to be a safe and 
comfortable sea-boat we do not express a decided opinion. Vessels of 
somewhat similar form, in that part of the vessel which is immersed, of 
light draught of water on our western lakes, have, we believe, proved 
entirely satisfactory in all weathers. To counteract the effect of the 
waves, when disturbed by the winds, by producing a jerk, or sudden 
rolling motion of flat, shoal vessels, it is proposed to carry a sufficient 
weight above the center of gravity to counterpoise the heavy weight 
below, which is done in this ship by the immense iron armor, If, after a 
full discussion and examination by experts of this plan, it should be 
decided that she is a safe vessel for sea service, we would recommend 
the construction upon it of one ship at one of our dock yards. 
The estimate cost of this ship, $1, 500, 000 precludes action upon the 
plan until further appropriations shall be made by Congress for such 
objects. 
Time not stated; length of vessel, 400 feet; breadth of beam, 60 feet, 
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depth of hold, 33 feet; draught of water, 16 feet; displacement, 6, 520 tons; 
speed per hour, at least 18 miles. 
Whitney & Roseland, Brooklyn, Greenpoint, page 13, propose an 
iron gunboat, armor of bars of iron and thin plate over it. No price 
stated. Dimensions of vessel, we think, will not bear the weight and 
possess stability. Time, 5 months. Not recommended. 
Length of vessel, 140 feet; breadth of beam, 28 feet; depth of hold, 
1 13 
z feet; draught of water, 8 feet. 
Donald McKay, Boston, page 16. — Vessel, in general dimensions 
and armor, approved. The speed estimated slow. The cost precludes the 
consideration of construction by the board. 
Price, $1, 000, 000; length of vessel, 227 feet; breadth of beam, 50 
1 feet; depth of hold, 26 & feet; time, 9 to 10 months; draught of water, 14 
feet; displacement, 3, 100 tons; speed per hour, 6 to 7 knots. 
William H. Wood, Jersey City, N. J. , page 14. — Dimensions will 
not float the guns high enough; not recommended. 
Price, $255, 000; length of vessel, 160 feet; breadth of beam, 34 feet; 
depth of hold, 22 feet; time, 4 months; draught of water, 13 feet; 
displacement, 1, 215 tons; speed, not stated. 
Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia, pages 7 and 8. — Vessel of wood 
and iron combined. This proposition we consider the most practicable 
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one for heavy armor. We recommend that a contract be made with that 
party, under a guarantee, with forfeiture in case of failure to comply 
with the specifications; and that the contract require the plates to be 15 
feet long and 36 inches wide, with a reservation of some modifications, 
which may occur as the work progresses, not to afFect the cost. 
Price, $780, 000; length of vessel, 220 feet; breadth of beam, 60 feet; 
depth of hold, 23 feet; time, 9 months; draught of water, 13 feet; 
1 displacement, 3, 296 tons; speed per hour, 9 & knots. 
Beqjamin Rathburn, , page 20. — We do not recommend the 
plan for adoption. 
Price not stated; length of vessel not stated; breadth of beam, 80 
feet; depth of hold, 74 feet; time not stated; draught of water, 25 feet; 
displacement, 15, 000 tons; speed, not stated. Specification incomplete. 
Henry R. Dunham, New York, page 11. — Vessel too costly for the 
appropriation; no drawings or specifications; not recommended. 
Price, $1, 200, 000; length of vessel, 325 feet; breadth of beam, 60 
feet; depth of hold not stated; time, 15 to 18 months; draught of water, 16 
feet; displacement not stated; speed per hour, 12 miles. 
C. S. Bushnell k Co. , New Haven, Conn. , page 121, propose a 
vessel to be iron-clad, on the rail and plate principal, and to obtain high 
speed. The objection to this vessel is the fear that she will not float her 
armor and load sufficiently high, and have stability enough for a sea 
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vessel. With a guarantee that she shall do these, we recommend on that 
basis a contract. 
Price, $235, 000; length of vessel, 180 feet; breadth of beam, — feet; 
2 depth of hold, 12 s feet; time, 4 months; draught of water, 10 feet; 
displacement, — tons; speed per hour, 12 knots. 
John Westwood, Cincinnati, Ohio, page 17. — Vessel of wood, with 
iron armor; plan good enough, but the breadth not enough to bear the 
armor. No detailed specification; no price or time stated; only a general 
drawing. Not recommended. 
Neafie &k Levy, Philadelphia, page 5. — No plans or drawings, 
therefore not considered. Neither price nor time stated 
Length of vessel, 200 feet; breadth of beam, 10 feet; depth of hold, 15 
feet; draught of water, 13 feet; displacement, 1, 718 tons; speed per hour, 
10 knots. 
Wm. Norris, New York, 26 Cedar street, page 6. — Iron boat 
without armor. Too small, and not received. 
Price, $32, 000; length of vessel, 83 feet; breadth of beam, 25 feet; 
depth of hold, 14 feet; time, 60 to 75 days; draught of water, 3 feet; 
displacement, 90 tons; speed not stated. 
Wm. Kingsley, Washington, D. C. , page 10, proposes a rubber- 
clad vessel, which we cannot recommend. No price or dimension 
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stated. 
A. Beche, New York, 82 Broadway, page 18. — Specification and 
sketch defective. Plan not approved. 
Price, $50, 000; length of vessel, 120 feet; breadth of beam, 55 feet; 
depth not stated; time, 100 days; draught of water, 6 feet; displacement, 
1, 000 tons; speed per hour, 8 knots. 
These three propositions recommended, viz: Bushnell & Co. , New 
Haven, Connecticut; Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia, and J. Ericsson, 
New York, will absorb $1, 290, 250 of the appropriation of $1, 500, 000, 
leaving $209, 750 yet unexpended. 
The board recommends that armor with heavy guns be placed on 
one of our river craft, or, if none will bear it, to construct a scow, which 
will answer to plate and shield the guns, for the river service on the 
Potomac, to be constructed or prepared by the government at the navy 
yard here for immediate use. 
We would further recommend that the department ask of 
Congress, at its next session, an appropriation, for experimenting on 
iron plates of different kinds, of $10, 000. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
JOSEPH SMITH, 
H. PAULDING. 
C. H. DAVIS 
Hon. Gideon Welles 
Secretary of the Navy. 
APPENDIX D 
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF THE GALKVA'S SUBCONTRACTORS 
New York 
Rennselaer and Albany 
Iron Works ~ 
Connecticut 
C. S. B hn 11 & C . Maxon 4 Fish 
Delamater Iron Works 
Continental 
Iron Works 
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